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INTRODUCTION
Internet intermediaries govern online life.' Internet service providers
(ISPs) and search engines are particularly central to the web's ecology. Us-
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Conference at Stanford Law School; the University of Montreal Conference "Is eCommerce Law Dif-
ferent?"; the Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop; the Annenberg School of Communications Col-
loquium on New Media and Technology (at the University of Pennsylvania); the Wharton School of
Business Colloquium on Media and Communications Law; the State of the Net West Policy Conference
at Santa Clara Law School; the University of Chicago Conference on the Internet, Free Speech, and Pri-
vacy; and the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference at Yale University. I am also grateful to
Seton Hall Law School's summer research fund for supporting this project. I wish to particularly thank
Barbara Cherry, Danielle Citron, James Grimmelmann, Brett Frischmann, Michael Madison, Marina
Lao, Paul Ohm, Joel Reidenberg, Jean-Baptiste Bruner, Michael P. Van Alstine, Julie Cohen, Simon
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I For a definition of intermediary, see Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Eco-
nomics ofIntermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 68-71 ("[Aln 'intermediary' can be any entity that
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ers rely on search services to map the web for them and use ISPs to connect
to one another. Economic sociologist David Stark has observed that
"search is the watchword of the information age."2 ISPs are often called
"carriers" to reflect the parallel between their own services in the new
economy and transportation infrastructure. As the dominant search engine
in the United States, Google frequently portrays its services as efficient,
scientific, and neutral methods of organizing the world's information.
Yet metaphors of transport and mapping obscure as much as they re-
veal. While everyone can understand the process of moving from one place
to another on a map, delivering bits and ranking websites is a far more
complex process. That complexity can often allow Internet intermediaries
to conceal their methods and operations from public scrutiny. Google's
secrecy about its website-ranking algorithm is well-known. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) found that another intermediary-
Comcast (the nation's largest broadband service provider)--obscured its
network management practices.4 It took a dogged engineer and investiga-
tive reporters months of sleuthing to provoke the agency to investigate.
enables the communication of information from one party to another. On the basis of this definition,
any provider of communications services (including telephone companies, cable companies, and Internet
service providers) qualify as intermediaries."). This Article focuses on the intermediary role of carriers
and search engines.
2 DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC LIFE 1 (2009)
("Among the many new information technologies that are reshaping work and daily life, perhaps none
are more empowering than the new technologies of search.... Whereas the steam engine, the electrical
turbine, the internal combustion engine, and the jet engine propelled the industrial economy, search en-
gines power the information economy.").
3 See, e.g., Richard Waters, Unrest Over Google's Secret Formula, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2010
("Prompted by three complaints, the European Commission this year began an informal investigation,
the first time that regulators have pried into the inner workings of the technology that lies at the heart of
Google."). This article suggests that U.S. regulators should consider a similar response.
4 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Se-
cretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) [hereinafter FCC Comcast Deci-
sion] (mem. op. and order). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit later found that the Commission
lacked "authority to regulate an Internet service provider's network management practices." Comcast
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The Commission has responded by initiating a No-
tice of Inquiry that could presage a new agency classification of "broadband Internet service" that would
give the Commission authority to regulate here. In the Matter of Framework for Broadband Internet
Service, GN Docket No. 10-127 1 (June 17, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-10- 14Al.pdf ("This Notice begins an open, public process to consider the adequacy
of the current legal framework within which the Commission promotes investment and innovation in,
and protects consumers of, broadband Internet service."). This Article challenges the primacy of "in-
vestment" and "innovation" concerns in FCC policymaking.
5 For a concrete example of the type of investigation required to detect problematic network man-
agement practices, see Daniel Roth, The Dark Lord of Broadband Tries to Fix Comcast's Image,
WIRED, Jan. 19, 2009, at 54, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/17-
02/mf brianroberts ("It took [a disgruntled Comcast customer] six weeks of short-burst sleuthing [to
conclude that] Comcast appeared to be blocking file-sharing applications by creating fake data packets
that interfered with trading sessions [because] [t]he packets were cleverly disguised to look as if they
were coming from the user, not the ISP.").
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The average customer is not capable of detecting many important forms of
problematic conduct by intermediaries. If intermediary misconduct only
negatively affects third parties, users have almost no incentive even to try to
detect it. 6
Legal scholars and policymakers have recognized these problems, and
usually promote competition and innovation as their solutions.' If a domi-
nant carrier or search engine is abusing its position, market-oriented scho-
lars say, economic forces will usually solve the problem,' and antitrust law
can step in when they don't.' Even those who favor net neutrality rules for
carriers are wary of applying them to other intermediaries."o All tend to as-
sume that the more "innovation" happens on the Internet, the more choices
users will have and the more efficient the market will become." Yet these
scholars have not paid enough attention to the kind of innovation that is best
for society, and whether the uncoordinated preferences of millions of web
users for low-cost convenience are likely to address the cultural and politi-
cal concerns that dominant intermediaries raise.
Part I of this Article investigates the noneconomic threats that domi-
nant intermediaries pose, particularly in terms of privacy, reputation, and
democratic culture. Many of the threats traditionally associated with ISPs
are also posed by search engines-and vice versa.12 As the convergence of
6 For example, if a searcher is indifferent to a certain range of results that a search engine produces,
but the search engine unfairly discriminates among the ranking of the results in that range, neither the
searcher nor the search engine has an incentive to stop the discrimination. In a world of satisficing
searchers, the possible range of results could be large for many queries. Moreover, as search results are
increasingly personalized, searched-for entities have a less clear idea of whether their sites are actually
reaching searchers.
See infra text accompanying note 101.
8 See, e.g., Douglas A. Hass, The Never- Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End
the Network Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1569, 1620-28 (2007) (describing "the
inherent enforcement difficulties in preemptive or ex post neutrality regulation," and doubting the utility
of antitrust law).
9 See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet:
The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1822, 1904 (2007) ("Just as the existence of alternative
sources of network capacity undercuts the justification for platform access on behalf of information ser-
vices, so too does competition between cable modem and DSL systems and the imminent emergence of
other broadband alternatives undercut the justification for imposing network neutrality.").
10 See, e.g., Gigi Sohn, Another Red Herring, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, June 5, 2006,
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/422 ("[I]f we require broadband network providers not to discri-
minate in favor of content, applications and services in which they have a financial interest, should we
not require the same from search engines like Google, Yahoo and MSN? ... [No, because] while
Google and Yahoo may be the most popular search engines, there are many others to choose from, un-
like the market for broadband network providers . . . ."). I address the limitations of an individualistic,
consumer perspective on the issue later in this Article.
See infra text accompanying note 101.
12 See Nicholas P. Dickerson, What Makes the Internet So Special? And Why, Where, How, and by
Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 Hous. L. REv. 61, 90-91 (2009) ("The policies of
Google ... represent a glaring example of corporate abuse of regulatory power.... Google has become
a crucial method of expression for anyone actively seeking to disseminate information on the Internet.
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voice and data on common "pipes" (or wireless connections) accelerates,
the joint ventures of leading Internet companies will raise a new host of
concerns about privacy, culture, and power online. A troubling asymmetry
has developed: as dominant intermediaries gather more information about
users, users have less sense of exactly how life online is being ordered by
the carriers and search engines they rely on.
Part II surveys the mainstream of communication and Internet scholar-
ship addressing this asymmetry. Deregulationists claim that undue discrim-
ination or invasive surveillance will cost an entity customers-and to the
extent market power forecloses that exit option, antitrust law is remedy
enough." Were new concerns about intermediaries wholly economic in na-
ture, such assurances might be persuasive. However, as Part III shows, the
cultural, political, and privacy concerns raised by search engines and carri-
ers cannot be translated into traditional economic analysis. They raise ques-
tions about the type of society we want to live in-a holistic inquiry that
cannot be reduced to the methodological individualism of neoclassical eco-
nomics.14
Fortunately, the information asymmetry between users and carriers has
been addressed in some agency actions. The FCC has begun to enforce
"net neutrality" via adjudication in order to proscribe certain forms of dis-
crimination by carriers." The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued
guidance to search engines indicating that they need to clearly distinguish
Unfortunately, Google has taken advantage of this power to determine which Internet speakers are heard
by refusing to accept many sponsored links simply because they fit Google's broad category of content
constituting 'advocacy against any individual, group, or organization.' Pursuant to this policy, Google
has refused to host many political, religious, or socially critical advertisements as well as the websites to
which these advertisements link. Google has thereby effectively, if not actually, silenced a great deal of
Internet speech." (footnotes omitted)); Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commer-
cial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 264 (favoring both net neutral-
ity and some forms of search neutrality); Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and
the Never-Ending Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets 2 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1095350 ("Should something like net neutrality prevail, the conflict would like-
ly move to a different level. That level might become search neutrality.").
See infra text accompanying notes 1]4-115.
14 As James R. Hackney, Jr., writes, "[T]here is no longer [a] viable claim to the epistemological
superiority of law and neoclassical economics .... The hegemony of legal-economic thought has come
to an end, and the field is also more diverse internally." JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF
SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 166 (2007). As
behavioral economics increasingly embraces insights from psychology, a general trend toward the unifi-
cation of the social sciences can be observed. For example, Robert Shiller has noted the urgency of al-
ternative approaches in the discipline. See Louis Uchitelle, Two Americans Are Awarded Nobel in
Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, at B l. Shiller asserts that the award of the Nobel Prize in eco-
nomics to Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson "is part of the merging of the social sciences. Econom-
ics has been too isolated and too stuck on the view that markets are efficient and self-regulating. It has
derailed our thinking." Id.
See FCC Comcast Decision, supra note 5.
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between paid and unpaid results.16 While these are respectable first steps,
neither agency has fully committed to an agenda of net neutrality or search
engine accountability. More troublingly, neither appears to have the institu-
tional capacity to truly understand whether carriers or search engines are
defying relevant agency guidance or abandoning their own avowed business
practices.
Where do we go from here? Public interest groups have made some
inroads in holding ISPs accountable, and will soon have no choice but to
confront Google's dominance." The same obstacles to holding Google ac-
countable (trade secret protection for its ordering algorithms) may also in-
terfere with network neutrality regulation. Like search engines, carriers
face an information overload problem, with spam, viruses, and high-
demand applications threatening to overwhelm their networks.'" They are
likely to make key network-management practices as confidential as search
engine rankings, and trade secret protection has already been deployed in
other technological settings to block critical review of questionable corpo-
rate behavior."
Part IV develops a regulatory response to these problems, focusing on
the current and growing asymmetry of information between intermediaries
and those trying to reach one another via the web. The first step toward ac-
countability is transparency. Key regulators at the FTC and FCC need to
fully understand how carriers manage networks and how dominant search
1 See DIV. OF ADVER. PRACTICES, FTC, RE: COMPLAINT REQUESTING INVESTIGATION OF VARIOUS
INTERNET SEARCH ENGINE COMPANIES FOR PAID PLACEMENT AND PAID INCLUSION PROGRAMS (June
27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.htm (FTC Response to
Commercial Alert); FTC DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING, (May
2000), available at http://www.fic.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus4l.pdf [hereinafter FTC,
DOT CoM DISCLOSURES]; see also Div. OF ADVER. PRACTICES, FTC, RE COMMERCIAL ALERT
COMPLAINT REQUESTING INVESTIGATION OF VARIOUS INTERNET SEARCH ENGINE COMPANIES FOR
PAID PLACEMENT AND PAID INCLUSION PROGRAMS (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
closings/staff/commercialalertattatch.shtm (FTC Letter to Search Engine Companies).
17 See Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Privacy? Proposed Google/DoubleClick Mer-
ger, http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2010); see also note 183 and accompanying
text. Calls for regulation of search have largely come from academics and programmers. See, e.g., Viva
R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 475, 488 (2009) ("Professor Frank Pasquale has
led the charge in arguing for ... more intensive regulation of search engines."); Drake Bennett, Stopping
Google: With One Company Now the World's Chief Gateway to Information, Some Critics Are Hatch-
ing Ways to Fight Its Influence, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2008, at KI, available at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobelideas/articles/2008/06/22/stopping_google ("[A] number of scho-
lars and programmers have begun to argue that the company is acquiring too much power over our
lives-invading our privacy, shaping our preferences, and controlling how we learn about and under-
stand the world around us.").
i For theoretical perspectives on the problem of information overload, see Frank Pasquale, Copy-
right in an Era of Information Overload, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 169-72 (2007) ("[A]ny bit of expres-
sion that signals something to one who wants exposure to it may constitute noise to thousands of
others.").
19 See infra text accompanying notes 306-312.
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engines map the web. Given legitimate needs for secrecy, this monitoring
need not be transparent to all-just to the relevant regulators charged with
maintaining the integrity of networks and search. Like the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court developed in the national security context, moni-
tors at the FCC and the FTC would balance intermediaries' need for
confidentiality with a public need for accountability. Developing such
monitoring is the first step toward assuring responsible Internet intermedia-
ries.
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNACCOUNTABLE INTERMEDIARIES
Scholars have long recognized the political and cultural power of the
media in democratic societies.20 Elections have been won and lost based on
impressions of candidates generated on broadcast television. Radio stations
have had extraordinary power over the careers of new recording artists.
Newspapers have driven civic agendas.
Each of these old media still perform important functions today, but
their power is waning. Traditional journalism is in crisis." Some financial
experts expect that reporting will be sustainable only if it is endowed like a
charity or university.22 Broadcast media are in less serious financial trouble,
but find their political and cultural clout declining and their profit margins
threatened.23 A secular trend toward narrowcasting has intensified on the
web, as more individuals forsake appointment television for the "long tail"
of online content.24 Though its role in some conservative political and reli-
20 See, e.g., DORIS A. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 206 (1980); DORIS A.
GRABER, PROCESSING THE NEWS: How PEOPLE TAME THE INFORMATION TIDE 1-2 (1993); THOMAS E.
PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER 210 (1993); John R. Petrocik, Campaigning and the Press: The Influence of
the Candidates, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN? 181, 184-85 (Shanto Iyengar & Richard Reeves eds., 1997)
(discussing the agenda-setting power of the media).
21 Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, A National Endowment for Journalism, GUARDIAN, Feb. 13, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/feb/I 2/newspapers-investigative-journ al-
ism-endowments/print ("The traditional newspaper is dying."); Jacob Weisberg, The New Hybrids: Why
the Debate About Financing Journalism Misses the Point, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2009,
http://www.slate.con/id/2211678 (describing the "sorry predicament of the newspaper industry").
22 All the News That's Free to Print: Is Charity the Newspaper Industry's Last, Best Hope?,
ECONOMIST, July 21, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?
storyid=14072274.
23 BOB GARFIELD, THE CHAOS SCENARIO 10 (2009) (arguing that traditional thirty-second ads and
other staples of the broadcast business model are increasingly irrelevant to marketing, rendering "TV as
we know it ... fundamentally doomed"); Tim Arango, Broadcast TV Faces Struggle to Stay Viable,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at Al ("Ratings over all for broadcast networks continue to decline, making
it harder for them to justify their high prices for advertising.... For the networks, the crisis is twofold:
cultural and financial.").
24 CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 18 (2006) ("[W]ith online distribution and retail, we are en-
tering a world of abundance.").
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gious groups is as strong as ever," radio generally has become less cultural-
ly relevant as younger listeners turn to digital venues for music.26
All of these developments have coincided with-and have in part been
caused by-the rise of new media, which feature online video, text, and
music. New intermediaries organize and control access to these offerings.
Content providers aim to be at the top of Google Search or Google News
results.27 Services like iTunes, Hulu, and YouTube offer audio and video
content. Social networks are extending their reach into each of these
areas.28 Cable-based ISPs like Comcast have their own relationships with
content providers."
When an Internet connection is dropped, or a search engine fails to
produce a result the searcher knows exists somewhere on the web, such
failures are obvious. However, most web experiences do not unfold in such
a binary, pass-fail manner. An ISP or search engine can slow down the
speed or reduce the ranking of a website in ways that are very hard for users
to detect. Moreover, there are many points of control, or layers, of the
web.30 Even when a user's experience causes suspicion, it is easy for any
blamed layer to shift responsibility to another entity.
Were carriers or search engines merely neutral infrastructure or maps,
such alterations of online experience might not be a concern of the law.
However, the new power of intermediaries over reputation and visibility
25 Jim Puzzanghera, Democrats Speak Out for Fairness Doctrine, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at Cl,
available at http://www.c3.ucla.edu/newsstand/media/a-push-for-reinstatement-of-the-fairness-doctrine/
(discussing the power of conservative talk radio).
26 See Posting of Larry Johnson to Paragon Media Strategies Blog, 2nd Annual Youth Radio & New
Media Study: Not Much More Damage iPods Can Do to Radio TSL,
http://www.paragonmediastrategies.com/theblog/?p=355#more-355, (Sept. 17, 2008, 22:28 EST) ("iPod
ownership is practically universal: 85% of 18-24 year olds own an iPod or portable MP3 device.").
27 See DEBORAH FALLOWS & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DATA MEMO: THE
POPULARITY AND IMPORTANCE OF SEARCH ENGINES 2 (Aug. 2004),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPDataMemoSearchengines.pdf ("The average visitor scrolled
through 1.8 result pages during a typical search."); Leslie Marable, False Oracles: Consumer Reaction
to Learning the Truth About How Search Engines Work: Results of an Ethnographic Study, CONSUMER
WEBWATCH, June 30, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/false-oracles.pdf
("The majority of participants never clicked beyond the first page of search results. They trusted search
engines to present only the best or most accurate, unbiased results on the first page.").
28 ALBERT-LASZL6 BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 19 (2002) (describing
the exponentially increasing value of nodes in a network as it encompasses more participants).
29 ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN
DUBIOUS TIMES 123 (2000) (describing how convergence of digital technology "eliminates the tradi-
tional distinctions between media and communications sectors").
30 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How TO STOP IT 67 (2008) (describ-
ing a physical layer, the "actual wires or airwaves over which data will flow;" an application layer,
"representing the tasks people might want to perform on the network;" a content layer, "containing ac-
tual information exchanged among the network's users;" and a social layer, "where new behaviors and
interactions among people are enabled by the technologies underneath").
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implicates several traditional concerns of the American legal system.' Sec-
tion A describes the power of intermediaries not only to monitor and track
what users do, but also to generate reputations based on that data. While
extant employment and credit reporting law regulates some entities which
generate and rely on background checks, no similar restrictions apply to
many sources of online data.32 Section B shows how the power of interme-
diaries affects the other side of the web equation: users' view of the online
world. While older communications law and policy addressed this issue in
many ways, Internet intermediaries are presently bound only by weak and
inadequate enforcement of consumer protection and false advertising sta-
tutes.
A. The New Panopticon
As Google gains market share," it has become a de facto lawmaker for
many aspects of life on the Internet.34 Google aspires to amass a compre-
hensive "database of intentions" of its users, many of whom have expressed
concerns about the misuse of such data." But these well-publicized anxie-
ties overlook two important lessons of the privacy and intermediaries story.
First, ISPs pose at least as great a threat to privacy as Google does, as they
have the opportunity to collect data not just on searches, but on all their us-
ers' time on the web. 6 Second, privacy itself has faded in importance in
31 Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribution of Control over
Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 183, 185-86 (1998) (describing the power of intermediaries over infor-
mation flow: "technology, institutional framework, and organizational adaptation ... determine ... who
can produce information, and who may or must consume, what type of information, under what condi-
tions, and to what effect"); Cotter, supra note 1, at 69-71 (discussing some of the functions of technolo-
gical intermediaries, including their control of information flow from suppliers to consumers).
32 Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating Personal Information into Hiring Deci-
sions, 23 LAB. LAW. 19, 38 (2007) (stating that Internet searches allow prospective employers to discov-
er candidate information that would be prohibited through traditional prescreening mediums); Robert
Sprague, Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 395, 399 (2008) (stating that the Internet provides a useful alternative to traditional prescreening
techniques which are restricted by various laws); Thomas F. Holt, Jr. & Mark D. Pomfret, Finding the
Right Fit: The Latest Toolfor Employers, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2006, at 29 (discussing the legal
implications of using Internet searches as a tool for screening job applicants).
Randall Stross, Everyone Loves Google, Until It's Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at BU3
(noting that Google's "market share gains have . .. been accelerating. . . [so that it now has] 72 percent
of the United States market, versus 17.9 percent for Yahoo").
34 See, e.g., Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1410 (2008) ("Google cur-
rently occupies a central role in online commerce and information retrieval.").
35 JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF
BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 4 (2005) (describing the company's effort to "leverage [a]
[d]atabase of Intentions in a commercial manner").
36 Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (ar-
guing that "nothing in society poses as grave a threat to privacy as the ISP, not even Google" because
"an ISP can always access even more [personal information] because it owns and operates ... the only
point on the network that sits between a user and the rest of the Internet.. .. [so] a user cannot say any-
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comparison with reputation." A critical mass of doctrine in intellectual
property and privacy law (along with established patterns of consumer be-
havior) has freed up a variety of previously unreachable information. As a
consequence, law now must concern itself not only with information's ac-
cumulation or flow, but with what results from that information: the rank-
ings, recommendations, or ratings derived from it."
Rumors about a person's sexual experiences, health status, incompe-
tence, or nastiness can percolate in blogs and message boards for years.
Search engines can then increase the salience of such information, making a
single mistake or scandal the dominant image of a person online." Even
more chillingly, the subject of such innuendo may never know its influence
on important decisionmakers. While many web users assume that they un-
derstand how the results generated by their name or business appear gener-
ally, we are really only aware of how such results are presented to us
individually. Personalization permits search engines to present custom-
tailored results based on users' past behavior.40
In order to understand the dangers such automated reputation creation
poses, consider each of the scenarios below:
(1) Imagine applying for a job, wanting to be sure to give the right im-
pression. A diligent self-googler, you think you know everything there is
out there on the web about you. Nothing sticks out in the first fifteen or so
pages of results.4 1 But there is someone with a name identical to yours who
has a terrible reputation. When the human resources department queries
thing to Google without saying it first to his ISP"). For a technical description of the movement of such
data, see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 657 (2003) ("Thus we might
think of typical movement of data on the Internet as having five distinct phases. It begins at (1) a
source, passes through (2) the source ISP, continues through transit and/or peering through (3) the cloud,
is handled by (4) the destination ISP and then arrives at (5) the destination.").
See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY
ON THE INTERNET (2007) (placing reputational effects at the center of privacy concerns).
38 Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 81-84 (describing power of interme-
diaries to enable new forms of reputation creation by making documented behaviors "reviewable by the
public at large").
Michael Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the Theory of "Contextual Integrity" to Cla-
rify the Privacy Threats of Google's Quest for the Perfect Search Engine, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109, 120
(2008) ("It is no longer acceptable to hide behind the rhetoric that no private information is divulged
when utilizing the tools that make up the perfect search engine, or that the information shared is simply
the same as that provided in other information-seeking scenarios.").
40 Rahul Telang et al., An Empirical Analysis of Internet Search Engine Choice 25 (Darden Gradu-
ate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Univ. of Va., Working Paper No. 03-05, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=412782 (finding the effect of loyalty is small when
users use engines for "simple search," but that "loyalty formation ... becomes highly significant when
the users start using personalized features").
41 Note that even these "vanity searches" may create privacy problems themselves. Christopher
Soghoian, The Problem ofAnonymous Vanity Searches, 3 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 299, 302
(2007) (noting that the Electronic Frontier Foundation advised "never to search for information on one-
self' because such a search potentially compromises the privacy of the rest of one's searches).
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Google with your name, that is the first set of results it sees. They have op-
timized their background check to focus on keywords like "arrest" and "as-
sault;" you have not trained your own search engine to focus on such
keywords. You are never given a reason for being turned down for the job,
but instead receive only a brief form letter.
(2) In a variation on the first scenario, imagine you had a bankruptcy or
foreclosure twenty years ago. It has been wiped off your credit reports, but
data miners put a record of the bankruptcy online, seeking to attract those
who might be interested in purchasing a more complete report about you.
After the data miners hire search engine optimizers to increase the promi-
nence of their sites, this record becomes the first-ranking result in searches
for your name. A digital scarlet letter removed from credit reports-which
potential creditors, landlords, and employers had to pay for-is now freely
available for anyone on the web to inspect.
(3) Next, imagine there are thousands of results about you or people
with names similar to yours, and you never see the record of the bankrupt-
cy. But when you apply for a job, the Human Resources department has
"personalized" its results to assure that the most damaging information
available about a person comes up first. You would also have to avail your-
self of this sort of personalizing software to be fully aware of all the nega-
tive information such personalized searches generate. Yet trade secrecy and
exclusive licensing deals prevent you from ever accessing an exact repli-
ca--or even a close facsimile-of the searches used by the educators, em-
ployers, landlords, bankers, and others making vital decisions about your
future.
(4) Finally, back to a more pedestrian scenario: You are an attorney
rated "mediocre" by a lawyer-rating site. When you ask the site to disclose
the data the rating is based on, it refuses. It also will not disclose the me-
thodology it uses to compile the data into a single score of your advocacy
abilities. If you sue, the company will assert that the First Amendment
cloaks it with an absolute immunity to accountability.42
As the scenarios above become more common, individuals may rea-
sonably fear that a crucial decisions about their opportunities are being
made on the basis of misunderstandings or an unfair and unbalanced infor-
mation environment. Automated search systems can easily reduce a com-
plex person to one trait, fact, or record, without the reductionism ever being
42 See Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1251 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (dismissing lawsuit
against laywer-rating site Avvo because "the opinions expressed through the rating system ... are abso-
lutely protected by the First Amendment"); Cliff Tuttle, Say Hello to A vvo, Whether You Like It or Not!,
9 LAW. J. 4, 9 (2007) (stating that Avvo's scores are determined by a secret algorithm); What is the Avvo
Rating?, http://www.avvo.com/supportlavvo-rating (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("The Avvo Rating is
based on all of the background information in a lawyer's profile. However, we do not disclose how we
weigh this information.").
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disclosed. Rumor and innuendo circulating online can also indiscriminately
harm the innocent.43
Reasonable individuals can differ about the degree to which such
harms are deserved and how much autonomy intermediaries should have in
gathering data and presenting results. However, there should be some basic
protections for those affected by the new automated reputation creation.
We can better understand the contours of such protections by articulating
the harms involved in each scenario.
The first scenario above is a simple case of mistaken identity, and pre-
sumably expedients like social security number matching would prevent it."
Yet the possibility of online mistaken identity cannot be dismissed as an
idle worry, in part because the present law surrounding applicant back-
ground checks using information from regulated entities may create incen-
tives for such quick and furtive peeks online.45 Like the "shoot, shovel, and
shut up" response to the Endangered Species Act,46 the quick and dirty
Google search may become a primary mode of evading the strictures that
the Fair Credit Reporting Act imposes on background checks using credit
43 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 71 (2009) ("[A]ttackers send da-
maging statements about victims to their employers and manipulate search engines to reproduce the da-
maging statements and pictures for others to see, creating digital 'scarlet letters' that destroy
reputations."); see also SOLOVE, supra note 37, at 203 ("With the use of search engines like Google,
employers can conduct amateur background checks without any legal protections [for potential em-
ployees].").
44 Many states have laws providing that employees and former employees have a right to inspect
files that the employer holds on them. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West 2003); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-128a (2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52C
(2004). Depending on the state law, "file" may include all sorts of documents used to determine an in-
dividual's employment, promotion, compensation, transfer, or termination, including in some cases
emails and faxes. Records of criminal investigations and letters of reference are often excluded from the
disclosure-access requirement. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5.
45 See Gaye Bunderson, Peering into the Past.. ., IDAHO Bus. REV., Mar. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.idahobusiness.net/archive.htm/2008/3/24/Peering-into-the-past- ("The cost of not having
background checks is a higher consequence to the bottom line than paying a small fee for a background
check.. . . Employers can be held financially and criminally liable for the actions of an employee. Es-
tablishing a pre-employment screening program can protect an employer against potential liability." (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); see also Donald Carrington Davis, MySpace Isn't Your Space:
Expanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act to Ensure Accountability and Fairness in Employer Searches
of Online Social Networking Services, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237, 239 (2007) ("Many employers
consider searching a candidate's MySpace or Facebook profile an inexpensive and convenient peek into
the candidate's life and character. Until recently . .. online social networking users remained generally
unaware of the fact that many employers were rejecting them because of something the employer found
on their MySpace profile." (footnotes omitted)).
46 For a description of this law-evading response, see Mollie Lee, Environmental Economics: A
Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456, 491 (2006) (discussing incen-
tives to eliminate endangered animals instead of submitting to legal requirements to report on and avoid
harming them).
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reports47-unless some version of that law is imposed on important deci-
sionmakers which utilize search engines to conduct internet-based back-
ground checks.4"
The second scenario-involving bankruptcy and foreclosure-is a var-
iation of the first, though this time the information is accurate. The third
situation intensifies the harm experienced in the second and comes close to
the core of my concerns in this Article. It is one thing to be judged on the
basis of a fault you know about; it is a different experience altogether to
have no idea what the basis of a negative judgment is.49 While such a prob-
lem might seem unlikely now, personalized search technology makes ig-
norance of personally damaging information increasingly possible in the
future. As a person uses a search engine, he gradually trains it to prioritize
certain types of results and deprioritize others.so This translation of beha-
4 Sprague, supra note 32, at 30 ("Under the FCRA, employers must notify the applicant in writing
if a report is to be obtained [from a credit reporting agency], and employers must notify an applicant if a
credit report is used in making an adverse decision .... ); id. at 36 ("Due to the restrictions facing em-
ployers in investigating the background of applicants, it is no wonder they have turned to the Internet to
investigate prospective employees.").
48 For a proposal along these lines, see Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fair Reputation Reporting Act, in
PRIVACY, FREE SPEECH, AND THE INTERNET (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore eds., forthcoming
2010). For a European precedent, see William McGeveran, Finnish Employers Cannot Google Appli-
cants, INFO/LAW, http://blogs.law.harvard.edulinfolaw/2006/l 1/15/finnish-employers-cannot-google-
applicants (Nov. 15, 2006) ("The country simply bans employers from googling [sic] applicants....
The new rule, issued by Finland's Data Protection Ombudsman, represents its official interpretation of
the statutory language of the 'Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life."'). See also Council
Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995LOO46:EN:HTML ("[O]n the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. . . .").
This prohibition is part of a larger genus of law in the EU known as "fair information practices." See
Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Codefor Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and
Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 743, 776 (describing the development of fair information
practices law).
49 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Pri-
vacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (2001) (applying Kafka's work to cyberspace and identifying "the
problem [as] the powerlessness, vulnerability, and dehumanization created by the assembly of dossiers
of personal information where individuals lack any meaningful form of participation in the collection
and use of their information").
50 With personalized search, a search engine can use artificial intelligence and other methods to
gradually "learn" what users most likely want given their pattern of responses to past results. For exam-
ple, if a user habitually searches for recipes, the search engine may weigh food sites more heavily than
other sites when confronted with an ambiguous term (such as "cake," which could refer, inter alia, to a
confection or to the rock band Cake). Such a sensitive "learning" search engine would save the user the
trouble of typing in longer terms like "cake food" or "cake cooking." Someone who never cooks but
likes rock music might see the band first; a devoted chef might see recipes first. See James Pitkow, et
al., Personalized Search: A Contextual Computing Approach May Prove a Breakthrough in Persona-
lized Search Efficiency, 45 COMM. OF ACM 50, 50 (2002) (discussing methods of personalizing search
systems); Elinor Mills, Google Automates Personalized Search, CNET NEWS, June 28, 2005,
http://www.news.com/Google-automates-personalized-search/2100-1032_3-5766899.html (reporting
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vior into a "database of intentions" helps searchers a great deal, but can
create uncertainty and anxiety for a person who becomes the object of oth-
ers' searches." While the "investigative consumer reports" (ICRs) generat-
ed by credit reporting agencies are subject to several strictures,52
personalized searches are not regulated in the United States. Again, the
regulatory framework surrounding extant background checks may unfairly
induce the use of informal digital methods that increase the chance of mi-
srecognition and reductionism.s"
One version of the fourth scenario has already generated a good deal of
controversy.54 The company Avvo aspires to rate all licensed attorneys
within the states it covers." The service is designed to help consumers
choose a lawyers by providing information about them." Each licensed at-
torney has a profile on the site originally created by Avvo that can be up-
dated with detailed information after it is claimed by the attorney using an
identity verification system."
that Google "launched a new version of its personalized search that monitors previous searches to refine
future results").
51 For a prescient examination of objectification resulting from reductionism here, see Julie E. Co-
hen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377
(2000) ("Our conceptions of property, choice, and information reinforce one another; under all of them,
individuals are treated as the natural and appropriate objects of others' trades, others' choices, others'
taxonomies, and others' speech.").
52 ICRa are:
dossiers on consumers that include information on character, reputation, personal characteristics,
and mode of living. ICRs are compiled from personal interviews with persons who know the con-
sumer. Since ICRs include especially sensitive information, the FCRA affords greater protections
for them. For instance, within three days of requesting an ICR, the requestor must inform the con-
sumer that an ICR is being compiled. The consumer also can request a statement explaining the
nature and scope of the investigation underlying the ICR.
Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Privacy of Your
Credit Report, http://epic.org/privacy/fcra (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
53 For a fuller description of the harm of reductionism, see Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism,
and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 115 (2006) (discussing the negative impact of partial or mis-
leading results in distorting searchers' impressions of a given queried subject).
54 See John Cook, Respected Lawyer Wants Rating Site Avvo Closed, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 12, 2007, at BI, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/business/319410_avvol2
.html ("Steve Berman, one of the best-known class-action attorneys in the country, said.... '[y]ou
have consumers who are going to be making decisions about whether or not to hire a lawyer based on a
rating system that is completely deceptive .... It is not reliable. It is not based on any valid criteria.
And, in fact, the publisher of this site should know there is something wrong."').
55 Id. Avvo.com claims to be adding more states all the time. The service currently covers twenty-
three states and the District of Columbia. Current State Coverage-Attorney Directory,
http://www.avvo.com/about-avvo/current-states (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
56 Lawyer Search, http://www.avvo.com/find-a-lawyer (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
57 For Lawyers, http://www.avvo.com/lawyer-marketing (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
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The right to claim the profile is a classic example of Web 2.0 business
models." Attorneys listed on the site ignore the profile at their peril, and
those critical of Avvo's project are put in a double-bind by the profile's
very existence." To the extent that critics tell "their side of the story" on
the profile, they are building up Avvo's database. The aggregator acts like
Tom Sawyer, inviting others to "paint the fence" by adding to the store of
data that increases its authority and comprehensiveness."o
Disgruntled attorneys filed a class action suit against Avvo on a con-
sumer protection theory, alleging that Avvo "purports to be objective when
it is not, and is subject to manipulation."" Moreover, the plaintiffs argued
the site was inconsistent, inaccurate, and biased.62 The court granted Av-
vo's motion to dismiss, holding that the "opinions expressed through the
rating system . .. are absolutely protected by the First Amendment."" The
court posited that the site did not deceive consumers because it "contains
numerous reminders that the Avvo rating system is subjective," generating
unfalsifiable opinions rather than facts that can be proven untrue."
In past work I have critiqued the Avvo opinion's method of First
Amendment analysis.65 If applied to general purpose search engines, it
threatens to "Lochnerize" the field. Fortunately, more nuanced analysis has
Brandon Brown, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 437 (2008) (defining Web 2.0 business models as websites that are based
on and encourage user-generated content).
9 Compare the pressure to "claim" one's Avvo profile to young people's increasing need to moni-
tor their Facebook pages. See Clive Thompson, Brave New World ofDigital Intimacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
7, 2008, at MM42 ("Ahan knows that she cannot simply walk away from her online life, because the
people she knows online won't stop talking about her, or posting unflattering photos. She needs to stay
on Facebook just to monitor what's being said about her.").
60 Josh Quittner, The Flickr Founders, TIME, Apr. 30, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1186931,00.html ("Tom Sawyer got it right. Why paint a fence when you can
get your friends to do it for you for free? He would have been the perfect new-media mogul. Spending
time and money creating content on the Internet is so hopelessly dated, so dotcom, so very, very 1.0.
The secret of today's successful Web 2.0 companies: build a place that attracts people by encouraging
them to create the content-thereby drawing even more people in to create even more stuff.").
61 Class Action Complaint at 171, Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(No. C07-0920RSL), 2007 WL 1752392.
62 See Avvo, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
63 Id at 1251.
6 Id at 1252.
65 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Ac-
countability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1149, 1189 (2008) (criticizing cases like Avvo
for "extend[ing] First Amendment protection to new domains on the basis of vague or enigmatic ratio-
nales"); see also Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. 61, 72 (2008) (casting doubt on the degree to which organizers of information should
be granted the First Amendment protection "to the extent that traditional content providers are pro-
tected"); DAWN NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH ONLINE 150
(2009) ("Congress can constitutionally regulate dominant search engine providers, not only to require
that they provide access to ... content [from 'diverse and antagonistic sources'] but also to require that
they provide meaningful access to such content.").
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informed the development of many physician rating sites, which have been
pressured to act more responsibly by doctors and regulators.66 Physicians'
efforts may set the tone for reputation regulation in employment, insurance,
and credit generally. Their demands for open inspection of criteria and data
used in doctor ratings produced by insurers helped inspire the proposals for
qualified transparency developed below.
B. Hidden Persuaders
The role of the media in influencing politics is well known." Despite
the power of carriers to influence the content their customers receive, their
potential for bias has not come to the fore until relatively recently. In one
notorious example, Verizon Wireless decided to block speech from the Na-
tional Abortion Rights Action League by refusing to carry the group's text-
message program on its network." Verizon reversed itself in this case only
after a media firestorm,69 but it still keeps in place the policy that allows it
to censor."o While its direct blocking of a controversial group stirred media
attention, subtler forms of degradation or slowing of disfavored content
might evade general detection."
See, e.g., Office of the Att'y Gen. Healthcare Indus. Taskforce, State of N.Y. Office of the Att'y
Gen., Doctor-Ranking Programs, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/healthcare/HIT2/doctor ranking
.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) ("In 2007, the [New York] Attorney General commenced an industry-
wide investigation into insurers' doctor-ranking programs.... The [Office of the Attorney General] has
settled with eight health insurance companies so far, instituting model reforms to ensure that any ranking
programs are based on accurate and transparent measure[s]-and monitored for compliance.").
67 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002); C. Edwin Baker, Giv-
ing the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 408 (1997) (describing the power of mass media
to shape political consciousness and warning that "the increasing national and global concentration of
media ownership into the hands of... megamedia giants creates the danger that these few owners will
guide development of political ... preferences along their preferred lines"). For example, Cumulus Me-
dia eliminated the Dixie Chicks from its playlists after the band criticized President Bush, and Sinclair
Broadcast Group helped promote the "Swift Boat" controversy in the 2004 presidential race. Jerry
Kang, Race.Net Neutrality, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 10 (2007); Jim Rutenberg, Broad-
cast Group to Pre-empt Programs for Anti-Kerry Film, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at A19, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/1 I/politics/campaign/I Ifilm.html?r-i.
68 Adam Liptak, Verizon Blocks Messages ofAbortion Rights Group, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at
Al ("Text messaging programs based on five- and six-digit short codes are a popular way to receive up-
dates on news, sports, weather and entertainment.").
69 See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 933, 933
(2008) (describing how Verizon eventually "backed down").
70 Jeffrey Rosen, Net Cemetery: Comcast, the Biggest Threat to Free Speech Since Nixon, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 12, 2009, at 10, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/net-cemetery ("When activists
objected to the decision, Verizon said it would block messages from all 'issues-oriented' groups, then
later apologized for the whole mess, blaming the initial decision on a 'dusty internal policy.' Neverthe-
less, it kept the policy in place-reserving the right to censor any content 'that, in its discretion, may be
seen as controversial or unsavory."').
71 Felix Stalder, Analysis Without Analysis, MUTE, July 28, 2008,
http://www.metamute.org/en/content/analysis without analysis ("There is a structural imbalance be-
tween the service providers who have a tangible incentive to expand their manipulative capacities and
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Given that most consumers have only one or two options, if any, for
broadband connectivity, network providers can easily use their services to
subtly advance their own political or cultural agendas without much fear of
losing customers.72 Commenting on the FCC-regulated broadcasters, Jerry
Kang notes that concentrated ownership "prompted the broadcast networks
to remain silent about the digital TV spectrum that was given gratis to cur-
rent television broadcast licensees, sans billions of dollars in auction pay-
ments."73 Moreover, as C. Edwin Baker has argued, the market itself cannot
be counted on to deliver socially optimal coverage of political news and
current events.74
Carriers that aggressively monetize their networks may squeeze out
disfavored content providers. Carriers are under increasing commercial
pressure to develop revenue streams by leveraging their intermediary role.
They may merge with content providers or just grant preferred access to
their business partners. Application and content providers frozen out of
such deals worry that they will face a pay-to-play regime in the absence of
network neutrality rules." Many intermediaries both bring third parties'
content to users and sell or monetize their own offerings." They have every
the average users, who will barely notice what's going on, since it would require a lot of effort to find
out."). For a concrete example of the type of investigation required to detect problematic network man-
agement practices, see Daniel Roth, The Dark Lord of Broadband Tries to Fix Comcast's Image,
WIRED, Jan. 19, 2009, at 54, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/l7-
02/mf brianroberts ("It took [a disgruntled Comcast customer] six weeks of short-burst sleuthing [to
conclude that] Comcast appeared to be blocking file-sharing applications by creating fake data packets
that interfered with trading sessions [because] [t]he packets were cleverly disguised to look as if they
were coming from the user, not the ISP."). But see Steven Musil, Google Prepping Broadband-
Monitoring Tools, CNET NEWS BLOG, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9968972-7.html (June 15,
2008, 9:50 PDT) (reporting that Google is now developing tools to make this monitoring easier).
72 Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access: Hearing Before the
Taskforce on Telecom and Antitrust, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45 (2006) (statement of
Timothy Wu, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) [hereinafter Wu Statement] (noting that "ninety-
four percent of Americans have either zero, one, or two choices for broadband access"). Admittedly,
these figures are subject to contestation, in part because of one of the problems addressed in this article:
trade secrecy protections for data submitted by companies to the FCC. See Benjamin W. Cramer, 'The
Nation's Broadband Success Story': The Secrecy of FCC Broadband Infrastructure Statistics,
31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 339, 340, 347 (2009) (discussing the lack of transparency "of the in-
formation that the FCC compiles before announcing its broadband deployment statistics-incoming data
supplied by private telecommunications companies," and the "politicization of broadband deployment
statistics").
73 Kang, supra note 67, at 10.
7 See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REv. 839, 876-
77 (2002) (documenting the negative effect of market pressures on political coverage).
7 For example, the Future of Music Coalition worries that "a new form of Internet payola [will]
emerge, with large Internet content providers striking business deals with the dominant Internet service
providers." Jenny Toomey & Michael Bracy, Op-Ed., Indie-Rock Revolution, Fueled by Net Neutrality,
THE HILL, June 13, 2006, at 23.
Several intermediaries are engaged in multiple businesses. For example: "Comcast is now the
cable monopoly in 40 of the top 50 markets[,] ... the third largest phone company in the U.S., and the
largest provider of broadband internet to homes, with nearly 15 million customers. . . ." Brooke Glad-
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incentive to privilege "content source partners" who share a cut of their
profits or offer other consideration?
From a purely economic perspective, it is difficult to criticize these de-
velopments. Vertical integration permits companies at different layers of
the Internet to codevelop mutually beneficial product configurations. Per-
haps big content providers' partnerships with carriers will lead them to
maximize sales. Consumers may be happier if, instead of dealing with a
fragmented entertainment landscape, they have more of a store of common
references." But we rightly object to a communications industry that can
systematically disadvantage the work of content providers unwilling to en-
gage in constraining business alliances or subtle payola." Moreover, letting
a small group of corporate actors profit excessively from broadband provi-
sion would convert an infrastructural asset into a parasitic bottleneck.
The political consequences of untrammeled carrier power over net-
works are also disturbing. Bill D. Herman has catalogued a number of ex-
amples of content and application blocking."o For example, during a bitter
labor dispute, the Canadian carrier Telus blocked access to a union web-
site," and AT&T censored the rock group Pearl Jam's anti-Bush lyrics.82
Though media pressure led each company to pledge to reform its behavior
in the future," no governmental institution has monitored such commit-
ments closely.
Extant incidents involving carriers blocking access to content they dis-
approve of and applications that compete with their own proprietary servic-
es have attracted the attention of a vocal activist community.84 While
stone, The Die Is Cast (NPR On the Media radio interview broadcast Feb. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2009/02/20/02. Perhaps in part to enhance demand for its own
content offerings, Comcast temporarily blocked BitTorrent, a file sharing service. Id.
Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 64-65 (2007) (discussing
both technological and market pressures for vertical integration of content and conduit).
78 GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX, at xv-xvi (2003) (discussing the correlation
between increasing consumer choice and stagnant or declining perceptions of well-being in advanced
industrial societies); BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 20-24 (2004)
(discussing cognitive psychology's documenting costs of excessive choice).
Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED.
COMM. L.J. 103, 119-23 (2006) (discussing instances of this kind of discrimination). Some telephone
companies have scuttled service directed to competitors Vonage and Skype. Id. at 120 & n.93.
8o See id. at 122.
81 Id.
82 Id; Nate Anderson, Pearl Jam Censored by AT&T, Calls for a Neutral 'Net, ARS TECHNICA,
Aug. 9, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070809-pearl-jam-censored-by-att-calls-for-a-
neutral-net.html.
83 Gil Kaufman, AT&T Admits It Edited Webcasts Before Pearl Jam's, MTV NEwS, Aug. 13, 2007,
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1566946/20070813/ pearljamjhtml ("'It's not our intent to edit po-
litical comments in webcasts... ' AT&T spokeswoman Tiffany Nels said.... 'Unfortunately, it has
happened in the past in a handful of cases. We have taken steps to ensure it won't happen again."').
8 See, e.g., Tim Karr, Seven Reasons: Why We Need Net Neutrality Now,
SAVETHEINTERNET.COM, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.savetheintemet.com/blog/09/08/03/seven-
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carriers try to trivialize each incident individually, the pattern suggests a
willingness to tilt the digital playing field." Public interest groups like Free
Press and Public Knowledge have organized protests against discriminatory
treatment of content online."
Public interest groups are now beginning to focus on the power of
search engines to organize the web." A critical media studies literature has
spurred this movement by chronicling how the "politics of search engines
matters."" As Alex Halavais argues, "[i]n the process of ranking results,
reasons-why-we-need-net-neutrality-now (discussing the timeliness and necessity of the introduction of
the Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009); Eric Schmidt, A Note to Google Users on Net Neutrali-
ty, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/help/netneutralityletter.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (request-
ing Internet users to contact their congressional representative regarding a bill in favor of net neutrality
introduced in the House of Representatives).
85 Peter Glaskowsky, Net Neutrality-Dead or Simply Hibernating?, CNET NEWS, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9773691-7.html ("The net neutrality controversy really flared up, as
[fellow CNet journalist Declan] McCullagh says, 'after AT&T CEO Edward Whitacre was quoted as
talking about (no longer) giving Google and other Internet companies a 'free ride' on his network, what-
ever that means."' (quoting Declan McCullagh, Ten Things that Finally Killed Net Neutrality, CNET
NEWS, Sept. 6, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9773538.html?tag=mncol;txt)); see also
Kaufman, supra note 83.
86 Public Knowledge and Free Press are public interest groups that advocate for consumer rights on-
line. They have lobbied against expansive intellectual property rules, broadband discrimination, and ex-
cessive corporate influence in the shaping of FCC policy. Cecilia Kang, Net Neutrality's Quiet
Crusader: Free Press 's Ben Scott Faces Down Titans, Regulators in Battle over Internet Control,
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2008, at DOI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/27/AR2008032703618.html (noting that members of the public-interest
group Free Press went to an FCC hearing to push for new rules for the Internet as well as that the pur-
pose of the hearing was to discuss Web regulations and policies that would determine how much control
cable and telecommunication companies have over the Internet).
87 Miguel Helft, Opposition to Google Books Settlement Jells, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/opposition-to-google-books-settlement (Apr. 17, 2009, 16:34
EST) ("Various groups, including the Internet Archive and Consumer Watchdog, have raised their con-
cerns with lawyers at the Justice Department."); Fred von Lohmann, Google Book Search Settlement: A
Reader's Guide, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/10/
google-books-settlement-readers-guide (Oct. 31, 2008) ("This is a huge change in the privacy we tradi-
tionally enjoy in libraries and bookstores .... "); EPIC, supra note 17 ("On April 20, 2007, EPIC, the
[Center for Digital Democracy], and [U.S. Public Interest Research Group] filed a complaint with the
Federal Trade Commission, requesting that the Commission open an investigation into the proposed ac-
quisition . . . ."); Marc Rotenberg, President of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Data Protec-
tion and Search Engines on the Internet: Google-DoubleClick and Other Case Studies, Address Before
the European Parliament and LIBE Committee (Jan. 21, 2008), available at http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/
google/EPICLIBESubmission.pdf (discussing the privacy concerns raised by the merger of Google
and DoubleClick); Letter from Jamie Court & John Simpson, Consumer Watchdog, to Eric Schmidt,
Chief Executive Officer, Google (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/CWLet
terToGooglel0-13-08.pdf (expressing concern that, among other things, Google Chrome's implementa-
tion of Google Suggest and Incognito features do not properly protect user privacy).
88 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (forthcoming 2010); see also Ale-
jandro M. Diaz, Through the Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design, in WEB
SEARCH 11, 28 (Amanda Spink & Michael Zimmer eds., 2008) (describing how the complexity and
opacity of search engine technology makes it "hard to see what's 'missing' from search results ... [and]
users are unlikely to even consider a switch"); Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web:
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search engines effectively create winners and losers on the web as a whole.
Now that search engines are moving into other realms, this often opaque
technology of ranking becomes kingmaker in new venues."" The power of
dominant intermediaries emerges naturally from struggles for prominence
online: "[T]he natural tendency of the web is to link very heavily to a small
number of sites," resulting in ranked results that predictably "pick[] win-
ners."o If, as Clifford Geertz memorably observed, "man is an animal sus-
pended in webs of significance he himself has spun," dominant search
engines are a key platform where these webs are woven on the internet."
Heated disputes are emerging regarding the duties that should constrain this
process and the norms that should guide it.
Consider some Republicans' fears that Google, a culturally liberal
company,92 is skewing search results to favor Barack Obama and marginal-
ize the right." Fox News has reported conservative discontent at Google's
rapid response to manipulated search results related to Barack Obama after
its glacial efforts to defuse a "google bomb" aimed at George W. Bush (in
which Bush's biography would appear when the words "miserable failure"
Why the Politics of Search Engines Matter, 16 INFo. SOC'Y 169, 177 (2000) ("The rich and powerful
clearly can influence the tendencies of search engines; their dollars can (and in a restricted way do al-
ready) play a decisive a role in what gets 'found."').
89 ALEX HALAVAIS, SEARCH ENGINE SOCIETY 85 (2009); see also Adam Raff, Search, but You May
Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/
28raff.html?_r=1 ("With 71 percent of the United States search market (and 90 percent in Britain),
Google's dominance of both search and search advertising gives it overwhelming control. ... One way
that Google exploits this control is by imposing covert 'penalties' that can strike legitimate and useful
Web sites, removing them entirely from its search results or placing them so far down the rankings that
they will in all likelihood never be found. For three years, my company's vertical search and price-
comparison site, Foundem, was effectively 'disappeared' from the Internet in this way.").
90 HALAVAIS, supra note 89, at 60.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 5 (2000 ed.) (1973).
For a compelling example of search engines' influence on worldviews, compare the searches for "Tia-
nanmen Square" images presented in James Grimmelmann's work. See James Grimmelmann, The
Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 939, 948 (2008-09) (presenting images of tanks from
Google.com and images of the Gate of Heavenly Peace from Google.cn). Google has announced that it
may stop cooperating with Chinese government requests for censorship. See Posting of David Drum-
mond to Official Google Blog, A New Approach to China, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/
new-approach-to-china.html (Jan. 12, 2010, 15:00 EST) ("We have decided we are no longer willing to
continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with
the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law,
if at all.").
92 See, e.g., Mary Anne Ostrom, Google CEO Eric Schmidt to Stump for Obama, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 20, 2008, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_10769458 (noting that
Google's CEO openly supported Obama); Posting of Sergey Brin to Offical Google Blog, Our Position
on California's No on 8 Campaign, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/our-position-on-californias-
no-on-8.html (Sept. 26, 2008, 15:23 EST) (describing the company's opposition to proposed ban on
same-sex marriage).
See Google News: Not So Fair and Balanced, Michelle Malkin Blog,
http://michellemalkin.com/2005/02/05/google-news-not-so-fair-and-balanced (Feb. 5, 2005, 18:49 EST)
(accusing Google of anticonservative bias in its selection of sources for inclusion in Google News).
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were searched).94 Although it took Google four years to address the issue
with respect to President Bush, when President Obama faced similar online
satire, "Google stepped in quickly, rectifying the situation in a few days.""
There are many good reasons for the difference in treatment." Google may
have learned from the Bush experience and may now be capable of far fast-
er responses to pranks." Or the company's engineers may dismiss such
manipulation as a silly prank that really should not waste their time. Never-
theless, political manipulation of Google merits some attention. Campaigns
are a struggle for salience, competitions with considerable stakes." As
more people form impressions of candidates from search results (or related
Google properties like YouTube), we might worry that allegedly neutral,
algorithmic representations of authority and popularity are really being in-
fluenced by a hidden agenda.
Part II explains why Internet policy that is based primarily on the pro-
motion of competition and innovation is unlikely to prevent any of the
problems mentioned above. Part III shows how market-based approaches
to Internet policymaking can exacerbate the trends toward unaccountable
intermediaries documented above. Part IV proposes monitoring and disclo-
sure designed to assure some accountability for search engines and other
key intermediaries.
II. COMPETITION AND INNOVATION AS FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNET POLICY
Innovation has been the central focus of Internet law and policy.99
While leading commentators sharply divide on the best way to promote in-
novation, they routinely elevate its importance. Business writers have cele-
brated search engines, social networks, and other startups as model
94 See Joshua Rhett Miller, Unlike Bush's 'Google Bomb,' Google Quickly Defuses Obama's,
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,485632,00.html (describing
Google's failure to change its algorithm to avoid a gamed result that led users searching "miserable fail-
ure" to President Bush's biography).
9 Id. ("The difference in time did not go unnoticed.").
96 Id.
97 Id
98 For more on the "struggle for salience" model of campaigning, see Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming
Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 644
("Utilizing statistical evidence from several campaigns, John Petrocik concludes that, to candidates, 'the
campaign [is] a marketing effort in which the goal is to achieve a strategic advantage by making prob-
lems that reflect owned issues the criteria by which voters make their choice."').
99 Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOzo L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manu-
script at 5), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1395779 (observing that, in
technology policy, "all parties raise innovation arguments to justify their positions"); see also, e.g.,
GARY REBACK, FREE THE MARKET!: WHY ONLY GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP THE MARKETPLACE
COMPETITIVE 374 (2009) ("To maintain the country's high standard of living in the coming decades,
antitrust policy must renew its commitment to competition, the font of economic growth. Competition
engenders innovation, and innovation will keep our country ahead in world markets.").
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corporations in a new service economy."o0 Academics have also promoted
their growth. For example, Lawrence Lessig has proposed eliminating the
FCC and replacing it with a streamlined entity with one goal and one way
to achieve it: promoting innovation and reducing the type of monopoly
power that can stand in its way.o' Innovation is the goal; competition is the
means for achieving it.
Lessig and other advocates of network neutrality worry that the owners
of the "pipes" that carry communications may impede that innovation by
favoring their own applications.'02 YouTube might never have developed if
Verizon could have throttled it in favor of its own video sharing site; online
innovation in general would be discouraged if carriers consistently charged
innovators more for access to customers as they became more successful.
The drama of "good innovators" versus "bad carriers" has pervaded net
neutrality advocacy.
Laissez-faire voices have disputed this vision,o3 contending that the
key competition Google or YouTube might face in the future is a search en-
gine or video-sharing service given a leg up by carriers.' On this view,
there is nothing special about the physical layer of Internet communications
that makes it uniquely dangerous for innovation."o' Advantage at the physi-
100 See, e.g., JEFF JARVIS, WHAT WOULD GOOGLE Do? (2009) (popular business book advising
companies to adopt Google's practices; title puns on the Christian Evangelical motto "What Would Je-
sus Do"); Bala lyer & Thomas H. Davenport, Reverse Engineering Google's Innovation Machine,
HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 1, 2008, at 59 ("In the pantheon of Internet-based companies, Google stands out
as both particularly successful and particularly innovative.").
101 Lawrence Lessig, Reboot the FCC, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 2008, at 45 ("President Obama should
get Congress to shut down the FCC and similar vestigial regulators, which put stability and special in-
terests above the public good. In their place, Congress should create something we could call the Inno-
vation Environment Protection Agency (iEPA), charged with a simple founding mission: 'minimal
intervention to maximize innovation.' The iEPA's core purpose would be to protect innovation from its
two historical enemies---excessive government favors, and excessive private monopoly power.").
102 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 46-48, 155-76, 246-49 (2001); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communi-
cations Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 395-98 (2007) [hereinafter, Crawford, Internet] ("By 'discrimina-
tion' I mean allowing network-access providers to treat some traffic or some users differently.").
103 See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transition from Regulation to Antitrust, 5 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 159, 182-84 (2006) (arguing that many forms of regulation of telecom-
munication companies are "in essential conflict with and obstructive of the developing dynamic compe-
tition among technologically different platforms"); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband
Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 65 (2004) [hereinafter Yoo, Comment] (objecting to net neutrality ad-
vocates' preference for homogeneous, "dumb" pipes, and concluding that differentiation may provide
for economic benefits by allowing networks to better satisfy heterogeneous customer preferences).
104 Arpan Sura, The Problems with Network Neutrality, INFO TECH & TELECOM NEWS, May 1,
2006, http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/18903/TheProblems-withNetworkNeutrality.html
("If a company wants to favor video or voice content, it can find consumers and applications providers
who use the Internet primarily for this purpose.").
105 For the distinction between layers on the Internet, see ZIrrRAIN, supra note 30, at 67 (describing
a physical layer, an application layer, a content layer, and a social layer).
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cal layer may be the only way a newcomer can challenge entrenched inter-
mediaries at the content or applications layers. This "clash of the titans"
approach defends combinations of firms and the rejection of regulatory im-
pediments to vertical integration.'o
Technological change and new business realities are now radically
challenging both extant interventionism and "market knows best" ap-
proaches. Rather than developing alternatives to dominant search engines
and social networks, carriers are partnering with them and combining forces
to create new communication technologies. The old narrative of "carrier
versus search engine" is giving way to new forms of cooperation that will
magnify the effects of bias by the collaborating entities. For example,
Google has coinvested with Comcast and handset manufacturers to develop
a new "Clearwire"o' network.' In return for its participation, "Google's
search engine [will] get[] its own button on the phones."'" It is hard to im-
agine a more effective "fast tracking" of one application provider's site past
others. As the landscape of Internet competition rapidly shifts, dominant
search engines like Google may become less a countervailing force keeping
carriers accountable and more a beneficiary of the very discriminatory tac-
tics they once decried. As such deals advance, disclosure of their terms is
essential to ensure that users know the incentives motivating the carriers
and search engines they use.110
106 Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 15-20 (2005) [herei-
nafter Yoo, Beyond Neutrality]; Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the
New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 295 (2002) ("[T]o the extent that anti-competitive dangers ex-
ist, they are better addressed in a forum, such as an antitrust court, that can evaluate each situation on the
basis of its individual facts.").
107 Clearwire is a high-speed Internet and phone service provider. See Clearwire,
https://www.clearwire.com/internet-phone-service/overview.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
1os Posting of Tom Steinert-Threlkeld to ZDNet Between the Lines Blog, Net Neutrality &
Google's Openness Before the FCC, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=9487 (July 30, 2008, 9:37 EST)
("Google says the network is open and Clearwire will only 'engage in reasonable and competitively-
neutral network management.' But, from a practical standpoint, is it 'competitively-neutral' if the man-
agers of the network favor one of their partners to be the door that customers open to enter the Inter-
net?"); cf ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 160-64 (2000) (chronicling
convergence deals in the late 1990s and the cultural concerns they raised).
109 Thomas Hazlett, On a Clearwire, You Can See Everything, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dacl5122-58cc-Ildd-a093-000077b07658.html?nclick-check-l. As Hazlett
puts it, if this "model, where the carrier extracts payment from mobile apps for a preferred spot on the
wireless web, is 'open'-then 'open' all capitalists must be." Id.
110 At a hearing on the proposed Google-Yahoo! joint venture, House Judiciary Chairman John
Conyers complained that neither he nor other committee members were allowed to inspect the terms of
the deal in a practicable manner. See Competition on the Internet: Hearing Before the Task Force on
Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 48 (2008) (state-
ment of Rep. John Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/hearings/printers/1 10th/43524.pdf at 2 [hereinafter Hearing] (complaining that the members of the
Committee were only permitted to inspect the deal if they viewed its terms "at a law firm with no notes
allowed"). Chairman Conyers further stated that "the Committee was given more ready access to the
documents surrounding the President's terrorist surveillance program" than it was to the terms of the
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As Internet traffic increases, carriers are likely to face the same dilem-
mas of information overload now managed by search engines."' Their ver-
tical integration with content providers is developing, and alliances with
powerful social networks are also possible. While network neutrality advo-
cates focus on the convergence of voice, data, and content on common
physical infrastructure,"l2 the joint ventures of leading Internet companies
will raise a new host of concerns about privacy, culture, and power online.
Calls for network neutrality are already morphing into demands for transpa-
rency and fairness from dominant intermediaries generally, be they search
engines, social networks, or carriers."'
Deregulationists believe that the market will punish any untoward be-
havior by intermediaries."4 They claim that undue discrimination or inva-
sive surveillance will cost an entity customers-and to the extent monopoly
proposed (and ultimately aborted) Google-Yahoo! joint venture. Id. (Video clip available at
http://www.c-spanarchives.org/library/index.php?main_page-product videoinfo&prod ucts id
=206402-l &showVid=true&clipStart-285.86&clipStop-368.60).
I For a sense of the dynamics of information overload here, see Ohm, supra note 36, at 1438 ("To
better understand why the relative slowness of computers has constrained ISP surveillance, picture net-
work monitoring like a police officer on the side of a road, scanning the passing traffic for drivers
swerving or speeding or for cars with outdated license plates. How thoroughly the officer inspects the
passing traffic depends on two metrics: the volume of traffic-the number of cars that pass by each
hour-and the efficiency of the officer-how quickly he can inspect a single car. On the Internet, com-
puters running monitoring tools are like the police officer and the rate of the network traffic flowing past
the computer-the flow rate or bandwidth-is like the volume of cars passing on the highway.").
112 Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006,
at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/AR200606070
2108.html.
113 NUNZIATO, supra note 65, at 111-14 (discussing Google's apparent censorship of several groups
in its advertising and news services). Nunziato argues that both carriers and search engines can distort
the communicative environment online in troubling ways. Id.; see also Richard Waters, Net Neutrality
Comes Back to Haunt Google, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 2010 ("This year, 'search neutrality' has become the
rallying cry of activists who believe that Google has too much power to decide which internet sites are
granted the attention that comes with a high search ranking, and which are consigned to outer dark-
ness."); Nate Anderson, After Net Neutrality, Will We Need "Google Neutrality?", ARS TECIINICA, Oct.
29, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/10/after-net-neutrality-will-we-need-google-
neutrality.ars ("[A]s cloud computing takes off, one company (again, this might well be Google) could
so completely dominate the market that it becomes another choke point. We might then need to consid-
er 'cloud neutrality."'); Kelly Heam, Google s Bias for Bigness, ALTERNET, http://www.altemet.org/
story/23397/ ("Google doesn't comment on its present or future ranking criteria .... But for alternative
online news services ... that rely on Google News-related traffic, the company's patent application of-
fers reason to worry about just how shallow a pool of sources the site will draw from.").
114 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1213 (1993)
(reviewing and praising MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (1992),
for promoting the idea that "advancing technology renders obsolete and arbitrary, if not also unlawful or
unconstitutional, the regulatory boundaries that currently divide various telecommunications firms and
circumscribe the services that they may provide"); see also Kahn, supra note 103; Yoo, Comment, supra
note 103.
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power prevents that loss of business, antitrust law is remedy enough."'
Were new concerns about intermediaries wholly economic in nature, such
assurances might justify a laissez-faire approach. However, the cultural,
political, and privacy concerns raised by the new business alliances of
search engines, social networks, and carriers cannot be translated into tradi-
tional economic analysis. They raise questions about the type of society we
want to live in-a holistic inquiry that cannot be reduced to the methodo-
logical individualism of economics.
This Part critically examines the legal academy's focus on purely eco-
nomic dimensions of carrier and search engine policy." 6 Section A demon-
strates the inadequacies of the primarily economic debate on broadband
policy that has focused on innovation economics, while Section B questions
competition as a prime policy goal for the search industry.
A. Net Neutrality as Innovation Policy
Both scholars and activists have promoted "network neutrality" rules
that would limit carriers' control over users' experience of the Internet."'
To bring the topic down to earth, these scholars tend to model Internet
communications as a form of transport of information, which should be
subject to common carriage rules."' However, as the section below demon-
strates, this metaphor and the underlying substantive policy may raise as
many questions about broadband governance as it answers.
Net neutrality advocacy has focused on carrier control as a threat to in-
novation."9 After weighing the potential harms and benefits of broadband
115 See Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality Debate?,
I INT'L J. COMm. 493, 511-17 (2007); see also Yoo, Beyond Neutrality, supra note 106, at 8 ("Econom-
ic theory suggests that network neutrality proponents are focusing on the wrong policy problem. One of
the basic tenets of vertical integration theory is that any chain of production will only be as efficient as
its least competitive link."). Yoo also worries about regulation stifling efficiencies and innovation. See
Yoo, Comment, supra note 103, at 55-59 ("Simply put, allowing network owners to employ different
protocols can foster innovation by allowing a wider range of network products to exist. Conversely,
compulsory standardization can reduce consumer surplus by limiting the variety of products available.").
1t6 I am attempting to bring an awareness of the limits of economics long present in media studies
to legal scholarship on intermediaries. See, e.g., Robert Entman & Steven S. Wildman, Reconciling
Economic and Non-Economic Perspectives on Media Policy: Transcending the "Marketplace of Ideas
42 J. COMM. 5 (1992).
17 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 101 ("Congress should create something we could call the Innova-
tion Environment Protection Agency (iEPA), charged with a simple founding mission: 'minimal inter-
vention to maximize innovation.' The iEPA's core purpose would be to protect innovation from its two
historical enemies-excessive government favors, and excessive private monopoly power.").
Its See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REv. 871, 877-83
(2009) (tracing "the tangled history of the legal notion of 'common carriage' in this country"); Wu, su-
pra note 102, at 165-68 (laying out a network neutrality proposal that would allow for local network
restrictions but treat internetwork restrictions as suspect).
119 See, e.g., Lessig & McChesney, supra note 112 ("How will this innovation and production thrive
if creators must seek permission from a cartel of network owners?").
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providers' discrimination, Barbara van Schewick has argued that "increas-
ing the amount of application-level innovation through network neutrality
regulation is more important than the costs associated with it." 20  Along
with Brett Frischmann and Spencer Weber Waller,121 Susan Crawford,122
and Timothy Wu,123 she suggests that network operators unconstrained by
such rules would inevitably be tempted to elevate the salience and availabil-
ity of partners' applications and content and thus block or degrade access to
competitors' applications. 24  For this reason, Frischmann has argued that
networks constitute infrastructure analogous to roads, bridges, and public
transit.125  Although managers of transportation networks can reasonably
charge more to certain customers at certain times to manage congestion or
perform repairs, it would be deeply unfair for the manager of a highway to
ban Volkswagen vehicles because it struck a special deal with General Mo-
tors. These concerns lead Sascha Meinrath and Victor Pickard to propose
an array of conditions on broadband networks in order to make them neutral
among business models.126
While the FCC has proven somewhat receptive to these ideas,'27 the
FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) re-
120 Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation,
5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 329 (2007). Van Schewick also applies "insights from game
theory, industrial organization, antitrust, evolutionary economics and management strategy to analyze
network operators' incentives to discriminate, the impact of potential discriminatory behavior on inno-
vation and social welfare, and the costs of regulation." Id. at 332.
121 Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J.
1, 2 (2008) ("Communications networks have traditionally been conceptualized as infrastructure subject
to substantial access and nondiscrimination norms and, as a result, have been heavily regulated.").
122 Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 960-61 (2008);
Susan Crawford Blog, FAQ on Net Neutrality, http://scrawford.blogware.com/blog/_archives/2006/5/31/
1998151.html (May 31, 2006, 23:57 EST).
123 Wu, supra note 102, at 144, 165-72 (showing "what a workable principle of network neutrality
would look like and what it would mean for the conduct of broadband providers").
124 See van Schewick, supra note 120, at 342-45.
125 Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 923-33 (2005). Frischmann argues, "[F]or some classes of important resources,
there are strong economic arguments for managing and sustaining the resources in an openly accessible
manner." Id at 918-19.
126 Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an
Open Internet, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2008, at 1, 18 (endorsing a network that "L. Requires common car-
riage; 2. Supports open architecture and open source driver development; 3. Maintains open protocols
and open standards; 4. Facilitates an end-to-end architecture (i.e., is based upon a 'dumb network'); 5.
Safeguards privacy (e.g., no back doors, deep packet inspection, etc.); 6. Fosters application-neutrality;
7. Mandates low-latency and first-in/first-out (i.e., requires adequate capacity); 8. Ensures interoperabili-
ty; 9. Remains business-model neutral; 10. Is governed by its users (i.e., is internationally representative
and non-Amerocentric)").
127 Even during the Bush Administration, the FCC was willing to challenge particular actions that
violated principles of net neutrality. See, e.g., FCC Comcast Decision, supra note 5, 32, 41
("[B]ecause Comcast's method, sending RST packets to both sides of a TCP connection, is the same me-
thod computers connected via TCP use to communicate with each other, a customer has no way of
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jected network neutrality regulation under the Bush Administration.' 28
Bush's Antitrust Division claimed that such regulation should not be im-
posed on broadband providers until abusive practices have been thoroughly
documented.'29 It believed that the broadband market is increasingly com-
petitive in that it gives consumers an exit option, even if they lack a voice in
network management. 30 Bush's DOJ accepted the general laissez-faire po-
sition that network operators will maximize the social utility of networks if
they can privately profit from the expansion of services on them.'3 '
Opposition to network neutrality has also taken hold in some fields of
communications law. Some legal scholars analogize the carriage of bits to
other transportation networks that can be congested, including the U.S. mail
knowing when Comcast (rather than its peer) terminates a connection. . . . [W]e think a case-by-case,
adjudicatory approach [to investigating such conduct] comports with congressional directives and
Commission precedents"). The Obama Administration's FCC Chairman is more of an advocate for net
neutrality rules than his predecessor, Kevin Martin. See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Preserv-
ing A Free and Open Internet: A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity, Remarks at the
Brookings Institution (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://openintemet.gov/read-speech.html ("Congress
and the President have charged the FCC with developing a National Broadband Plan to ensure that every
American has access to open and robust broadband.").
128 See Ex Parte Filing of U.S. Dep't of Justice at 1, In re Broadband Industry Practices, No. 07-52
(Fed. Commc'n Comm'n Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/225767
.pdf (asserting that free market competition, "enforced by antitrust laws," is the best way to foster inno-
vation and the development of the Internet) [hereinafter DOJ Ex Parte Filing]; BROADBAND
CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY, FTC STAFF REPORT 157-61 (June 2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf (announcing FTC's caution regarding regula-
tory moves here).
129 DOJ Ex Parte Filing, supra note 128, at 5 ("[D]espite the Commission's request for evidence of
harmful discrimination or behavior, as discussed further below, cornmenters failed to present evidence
suggesting that a problem exists."). The DOJ here followed a long line of laissez-faire analysts who
have argued that preemptive regulation is unnecessary. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 103, at 183 (assert-
ing that the broadband market is not suited for public utility-style regulation); Sidak, supra note 114, at
1209 ("American telecommunications regulation is about to collapse like the walls of Jericho.").
130 See DOJ Ex Parte Filing, supra note 128, at 7 ("The Commission's statistics report that the total
number of broadband fiber lines increased from 40,627 in 2000 to 698,990 as of June 30, 2006, and the
number of residential broadband fiber lines likewise increased from 325 in 2000 to 442,027 fiber lines
as of June 30, 2006."). But see Wu Statement, supra note 72, at 55 ("Ninety-four percent of Americans
have either zero, one, or two choices for broadband access.").
131 See DOJ Ex Parte Filing, supra note 128, at 4 ("Precluding broadband providers from charging
fees for priority service could shift the entire burden of implementing costly network expansions and
improvements onto consumers. Because the average consumer may be unwilling or unable to pay sig-
nificantly more for access to the Internet in order to ensure smooth delivery to consumers demanding
bandwidth-intensive and latency-sensitive content, critical network expansion and improvement may be
significantly reduced or delayed."); see also Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neu-
tral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 577 (2007) ("At this point, it is
impossible to foresee which architecture will ultimately represent the best approach. When it is imposs-
ible to tell whether a practice would promote or hinder competition, the accepted policy response is to
permit the practice to go forward until actual harm to consumers can be proven. This restraint provides
the room for experimentation upon which the normal competitive processes depend.").
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delivery system.132 The U.S. Postal Service lets customers purchase priority
mail delivery, and private carriers such as FedEx provide this and other
forms of service. Network-neutrality opponents similarly point to airlines
that cross-subsidize rural routes by selling very high-priced business seats
and using those revenues to make up for seats sold for below average cost
on the rest of the plane."' Network operators argue that a "fast lane" of
access is necessary to fund infrastructural improvements that (may even-
tually) redound to everyone's benefit.'34 From this perspective, price dis-
crimination is the best way to ensure efficient allocation of Internet
resources."' These arguments play the "wrong metaphor" card-the insis-
tence that economic theory supporting net neutrality incorrectly analogizes
Internet communications networks to traditional common carriers.'36
Network neutrality supporters contend that a division of access into
slow and fast lanes would lead to more invasive and counterproductive
132 Wu & Yoo, supra note 131, at 578-79 (Yoo argues that the same logic of having "tiered" postal
services like FedEx can be applied to having "tiered access" on the Internet); Christopher S. Yoo, Net-
work Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1879 (2006) ("As an initial mat-
ter, the Internet is subject to congestion in a way that was not true with respect to conventional telephone
service.... [T]he attachment of devices used to run bandwidth-intensive applications to the network
can adversely affect the quality of service enjoyed by other end users, and these devices arguably
represent situations in which restrictions on attaching devices would be permissible under both Carter-
fone [In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968)] and Hush-
a-Phone [Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)]."). But see Philip J.
Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 284-85 (2008) ("[Some]
claim that robust competition in the broadband marketplace will prevent firms from acting in an anti-
competitive fashion.... [t]he reality, however, is that the search for the third broadband pipe-i.e., an
alternative to cable modem and DSL connections-is ongoing, and the broadband access marketplace is
largely a duopoly. In this respect, the broadband market differs from that of, for example, overnight de-
livery both in that U.S. post office 'best effort' delivery is regulated and there is considerable competi-
tion in the overnight delivery market (there are at least four facilities-based providers).").
133 See Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, The Myth of Network Neutrality and What We Should
Do About It 10-11 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center, Working Paper No. RPO6-33, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-947847.
134 See C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation,
25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 172 (2008) ("In particular, access providers could subsidize consumer adoption
by charging content providers for access. AT&T's pitch might be: 'We're committed to pervasive
broadband service, and to making access available to the millions who lack such service, by asking suc-
cessful content providers to tithe a fraction of their profits, to be applied toward the provision of new
consumer access."' (footnotes omitted)).
135 See Yoo, Comment, supra note 103, at 59-65 (arguing that allowing last-mile providers to use
vertical integration to differentiate their networks would allow the realization of certain efficiencies and
would permit them to offer a broader range of services).
136 See David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing Jefferson's Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Ap-
proach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 203, 217-18 (2009)
(discussing the arguments of the Telecommunications Industry Association and the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association, and concluding that "the primary thrust of industry rhetor-
ic .. . valorizes unregulated competition and markets").
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management of the Internet.'" They generally believe that Internet access
is properly structured as a commodity service to be modeled on the electric
grid:
The general purpose and neutral nature of the electric grid is one of the things
that make it extremely useful. The electric grid does not care if you plug in a
toaster, an iron, or a computer. Consequently it has survived and supported
giant waves of innovation in the appliance market.'38
For example, without a neutral electrical grid, an appliance manufacturer
like Maytag could strike deals with utility companies, giving Maytag exclu-
sive access to "high quality" current in exchange for some cut of Maytag's
profits.' A long history of public utility regulation has presumed the op-
posite-that "business affected with a public interest" should not be able to
take advantage of its monopolistic or quasimonopolistic position to "pick
winners" among the products and services dependent on the utility.'4 0
By expanding the concept of a neutral electric grid to the digital age,
Tim Wu has become one of the most prominent advocates for applying
nondiscrimination principles to the Internet. He focuses on the "common
carriage" requirements that telephone companies have had to respect since
the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913, where AT&T became a government-
sanctioned monopoly in exchange for divesting some of its current and fu-
ture interests in other companies."' Later, in the Hush-a-Phone and Carter-
137 See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1974, 1978 (2006) (citing
scholars who have argued for keeping the Internet "open").
138 Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, http://timwu.org/network-neutrality.html (last visited Mar.
12,2010).
139 See Herman, supra note 79, at 110 ("Just as the electrical grid gives innovators a stable, consis-
tent system on which one can count in developing applications, a neutral broadband network permits
innovators to plan based on stable expectations." (footnotes omitted)). Devices are increasingly capable
of reporting user behavior back to product manufacturers. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony:
The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749,
750-51 (2005) (suggesting a potential duty by manufacturers to report on copyright infringement, be-
cause "the feature set of the product is defined in many ways by [the software that it comes
with]... . [and] there are no natural boundaries to define the features of the product"). New advances in
surveillance and reporting technology embedded in devices (such as RFID chips) encourage such busi-
ness models. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 381, 392-93 (2005) (describing the malleability of many devices and services on the
Internet).
140 CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST INEQUALITY 133, 163-65 (1986); see also Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and
Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1233, 1239 (1998) ("[T]he public utility duty to serve ... is comprised of distinct obligations to extend
service, and to maintain certain quality standards once service commences.. .. [T]he obligations appli-
cable to utilities are extraordinary, often requiring utilities to extend and provide service to customers
where it is not always profitable to do so.").
141 Wu, supra note 138 ("The concept of a 'common carrier,' dating from 16th century English
common law, captures many similar concepts [as the term 'network neutrality']. A common carrier, in
132
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fone cases,142 antitrust enforcers successfully moved to prevent AT&T from
banning the attachment of objects to telephones that did not affect the quali-
ty of service generally.143  The FCC and the courts reasoned that the tele-
phone company should not be permitted to control the development of all
the devices that would eventually be capable of transmitting data over its
lines.'"
Advocates of nondiscrimination norms worry that the types of sharp
practices that would make little sense in real space could easily be imposed
in cyberspace. For example, it is hard to imagine why an airline would,
say, refuse access to Marriott employees because it has a business relation-
ship with Hyatt.145  Even if Hyatt leveraged such a deal, the uproar in the
press would be enormous. However, when Comcast bid for control of Walt
Disney in 2004,146 it would have been easy for the company to engineer
fast-track access to Disney content on its network had the takeover suc-
ceeded. Norms of fair play on the Internet are so fluid that the media would
be unlikely to find this integration of content and conduit particularly re-
markable.' 47
its original meaning, is a private entity that performs a public function...."); AT&T, Milestones in
AT&THistory, http://www.att.com/history/milestones.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010); see also Barbara
A. Cherry, Maintaining Critical Rules to Enable Sustainable Communications Infrastructures, 24 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 947, 950 (2008) ("[A] historically accurate understanding of legal developments in the
United States reveals the importance of common law principles of common carriage and public utility
law-which include imposition of ex ante requirements on providers in the retail market-in generating
the desired emergent properties of widely available, affordable and reliable transportation and telecom-
munications infrastructures.").
142 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Use of the Carter-
fone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
143 See Rob Frieden, Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and Carri-
ers 14-15 (Jan. 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1081345). The
Carterfone decision required the telephone companies to allow the attachment of modems and fax ma-
chines. Id. This decision was later reaffirmed by one of the most deregulatory FCC Chairmen in the
agency's history, Michael Powell, in the "four freedoms" he aimed to guarantee to carriers' customers.
Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Fleedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry,
Remarks Delivered to the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a
Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age 5 (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-243556Al.pdf ("[C]onsumers should be permitted to attach any devices they
choose to the connection in their homes.").
144 See Hush-a-Phone, 238 F.2d at 269. The Hush-a-Phone was a rubber cup placed over a mouth-
piece designed to enhance the privacy of phone conversations. Carriers claimed the right to prohibit
such attachments, but were ultimately denied that prerogative by this decision. Id. at 267-69.
14S See Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED.
CoMM. L.J. 103, 131-33 (2007) (arguing that even cable networks cannot be analogized to Internet net-
works).
146 See Geraldine Fabrikant et al., Cable Giant Bids to Take Over Disney, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2004, at Al.
147 See, e.g., Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Un-
veiling the Scope of Copyright's Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1067, 1079 (2003) (discuss-
ing how "the pros and cons of copyright should be examined .. . in terms of diversity" because
copyright protection "influence[s] both democratic and individual meaning-making processes"); cf
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Reacting against such quiescence, Frischmann and van Schewick urge
a principle of network neutrality designed to "insulat[e] end users from
market-driven restrictions on access and use." 4" They endorse fierce com-
petition among application and content providers and believe that such
competition will be possible only if broadband providers cannot "pick win-
ners" by favoring certain competitors.'49 They are skeptical of some pro-
grams that would allow network owners to "scan" packets of data to deter-
determine their nature and provenance.' Instead, they propose a network
that would not "distinguish between end uses, [would not] base access deci-
sions or pricing on how those packets may be used," and would not "optim-
ize the infrastructure for a particular class of end uses.""' Frischmann and
van Schewick claim that nondiscrimination principles at an infrastructural
layer are needed to ensure innovation in the content and application layers
that run on top of it.
Frischmann and van Schewick acknowledge the current "pressure for
property rights evolution so that network owners may more fully internalize
externalities and appropriate the value of the Internet."'52 However, they
observe some clear divergences between maximizing the private gains of
network owners and maximizing the overall social gains that unfettered In-
ternet access can generate. Following Lawrence Lessig's'" and Yochai
Benkler's'54 principles, Frischmann and van Schewick argue that online in-
novation results from the Internet's open architecture, which allows anyone
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Inter-
net in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 946 (2001) (contending that the cost of eliminating
ISP competition in the cable market is home by the market, not the consumer, as consumers do not feel
any direct loss when new innovations are stifled).
148 Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an In-
formation Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 386 (2007); see also Lem-
ley & Lessig, supra note 147, at 964 ("All we propose is that cable companies be permitted to charge
consumers for access to their wires, but not be permitted to bundle ISP services together with wire
access."); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communica-
tions, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 15, 17 (2006) ("The rule should be (1) a general norm that is
technologically neutral, (2) in the form of an ex ante rule with ex post remedies, and (3) anchored on a
model of consumers' rights.").
149 Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 148, at 420-23.
150 Id. at 387.
151 Id. at 386.
152 Id. at 387. Examples of this pressure are evident in MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY 80-84 (2008) (discussing network owners' desire to increase profits).
153 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOwN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 276-77, 282-306 (2004) ("What's needed is a way
to say something in the middle-neither 'all rights reserved' nor 'no rights reserved' but 'some rights
reserved'-and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as they see fit.").
154 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 470-73 (2006), available at
http://www.benkler.org ("To flourish, a networked information economy rich in social production prac-
tices requires a core common infrastructure, a set of resources necessary for information production and
exchange that are open for all to use.").
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with a "better idea" to supplant dominant players (or at least to usurp some
of their market share and attention).'55 They acknowledge that the "end-to-
end principle acts as a limitation on the property rights of network owners,"
but insist that it is only a limitation to the extent that "fair use operates as a
limitation on the rights of copyright owners. "15' The fair use analogy is fe-
licitous; as Richard Posner has stated, an absolute bar on fair use could se-
riously undermine book sales by reducing the amount of uncensored
information available about books."' Though individual copyright holders
may gain a great deal by, say, forbidding quotes from their books that may
be treated negatively, the book industry in general would be negatively af-
fected by the lack of quality information about its products.
During the Bush Administration, an impressive group of scholars and
activists joined Frischmann and van Schewick in challenging the economic
arguments against network neutrality."' They are increasingly influential
among communications policymakers in the Obama Administration. How-
ever, influential deregulationists continue to insist that the only proper role
for government here is to remedy past discriminatory conduct (an antitrust
model), rather than to legislate nondiscrimination or promulgate rules based
on current statutes."' The deregulationists have also argued that the FCC
has not collected enough data to justify net neutrality regulations.'60
Although former Senator Ted Stevens was roundly mocked for remind-
ing network neutrality advocates that the Internet is "not a big truck,"'"' it is
155 Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 148, at 387-89.
156 Id. at 386.
157 Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]o deem such quotation an
infringement would greatly reduce the credibility of book reviews, to the detriment of copyright owners
as a group, though not to the owners of copyright on the worst books. Book reviews would no longer
serve the reading public as a useful guide to which books to buy. Book reviews that quote from ('copy')
the books being reviewed increase the demand for copyrighted works; to deem such copying infringe-
ment would therefore be perverse, and so the fair-use doctrine permits such copying."); see also Frank
Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers,
60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 186-87 (2007) [hereinafter Pasquale, Categorizers] (discussing "captured cate-
gorizers").
1 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 102; Daniel J. Weitzner, The Neutral Internet: An Information Archi-
tecture for Open Societies (June 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2006/06/neutralnet.pdf); Center for Democracy and Technology, Preserving the
Essential Internet (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.cdt.org/
speech/20060620neutrality.pdf).
159 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 103, at 166.
160 See Yoo, supra note 131, at 577; Opderbeck, supra note 136, at 217-18 (noting that the National
Cable and Telecommunications Association has argued that "[t]hose who call for regulation of the Inter-
net in the name of 'network neutrality' are offering a solution in search of a problem since there is no
evidence of a market failure justifying the imposition of common carrier-like regulation on broadband
services").
161 Public Knowledge, Senator Stevens Speaks on Net Neutrality (June 28, 2006),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/497; Communications Reform Bill: Full Committee Markup Be-
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difficult to invoke a metaphor that can capture the rapidly changing tech-
nologies deployed by carriers. Network neutrality advocates invoke rai-
lroads, electric grids, and highways to describe the Internet, and insist that
economic theory valid in those realms can be applied to carriers.'62 By con-
trast, opponents contend either that rival economic theories favor the dere-
gulation or privatization of all of these transportation platforms, or that
none of these platforms involve spam, viruses, "bandwidth hogs," or the
type of contraband content now circulating on the web.' Network neutrali-
ty opponents also argue that the cross-subsidization now practiced on air-
lines and some mail carriers should become part of network operators'
business models. As Part III below demonstrates, transportation regulation
may well constitute the wrong metaphor for modeling network manage-
ment, if only because the cultural consequences of the latter are far more
significant than those of the former. If content and application providers
are willing to pay for priority access to consumers, should regulators deny
them the opportunity to shift some of the burden of paying for broadband
away from end users and toward those willing to pay to reach them?
Wholly economic methods of analysis cannot answer that question in a
normatively satisfying manner. Economic analysis of the network neutrali-
ty question is essentially contested given the uncertain future development
of technology in the field.'" The task now is to assure that corporate dep-
loyment of such technology responds to the cultural, political, and privacy
interests of citizens, not just the demands of consumers.
B. Search Policy as Competition Promotion
Laissez-faire analysts argue that antitrust law provides ample remedies
to penalize discrimination should it prove "anti-competitive.""' They offer
sponsored and independent research highlighting investment produced by
deregulation and the resulting competition that would discipline discrimina-
fore the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Ted Ste-
vens, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp.).
162 Lessig & McChesney, supra note I12.
163 See, e.g., Scott Cleland, The Precursor Blog, Has Tim Wu Lost His Credibility? in His Tunnel-
Vision Piece: "Has AT&T Lost Its Mind? ", http://precursorblog.com/node/631 (Jan. 16, 2008, 17:55
EST) (arguing that net neutrality proposals will hamper carriers' ability to fight malware, spam, and bad
actors). For a balanced overview of the communications law issues involved, see Rob Frieden, Internet
Packet Sniffing and its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power Between In-
tellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633
(2008).
'6 See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 171-72
(1956) (describing the idea of the "essentially contested concept" as a term which cannot be defined
neutrally, but instead is inevitably freighted with value judgments).
165 See Net Neutrality (Genny Pershing ed.), http://www.cybertelecom.org/ci/neutral.htm (last vi-
sited Mar. 12, 2010) ("Opponents [of net neutrality] argue that any harm caused by discriminatory beha-
vior of networks can be adequately resolved by the ex post remedies of antitrust.").
136
104:105 (2010) Beyond Innovation and Competition
tory providers.' In response, advocates of network neutrality have devel-
oped rival economic models demonstrating efficiency gains from enforcea-
ble prohibitions against discrimination."' Even though these advocates
welcome antitrust liability for anticompetitive deprioritization of carriers'
rivals, they doubt antitrust actions would be initiated quickly enough to ef-
fectively deter discrimination.'68 They seek forward-looking rules, not
backward-looking antitrust litigation that would mire all concerned in years
of discovery and second guessing by appellate courts increasingly skeptical
of per se illegality.' 9
Although scholars rigorously defend network neutrality rules from a
law and economics perspective, they risk falling into the same "antitrust
trap" that they urge policymakers to avoid. Antitrust cases tend to consume
a great deal of time, in part because economic conduct is subject to many
different interpretations.'70 One person's anticompetitive conduct is anoth-
er's effective business strategy. The same unending (and indeterminate) ar-
guments threaten to stall discourse on network neutrality and Internet
governance generally."' For example, the FTC's review of the Google-
166 See, e.g., HANCE HANEY, THE AMERICAN CONSUMER INSTITUTE CENTER FOR CITIZEN
RESEARCH, NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION WOULD IMPOSE CONSUMER WELFARE LOSSES, IN
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NET NEUTRALITY REGULATIONS ON BROADBAND INVESTMENT AND
CONSUMER WELFARE, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 50-51 (2009), available at
http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/final-consequences-of-net-
neutrality.pdf.
167 Trevor R. Roycroft, Economic Analysis and Network Neutrality: Separating Empirical Facts
from Theoretical Fiction (June 2006) (unpublished issue brief, available at
http://net.educause.edulir/library/pdflEPO0652.pdf) (analyzing the effect of net neutrality from an eco-
nomic perspective and concluding that network neutrality should not be abandoned).
168 Net Neutrality, supra note 165 ("Proponents [of net neutrality] argue that ... while anti trust
[sic] serves to address the problem of excessive market power, it does so at a very slow pace and fails to
adequately address consumer protection interests .... ).
169 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881 (2007) (overrul-
ing ninety-six year old doctrine of holding vertical price restraints per se illegal, holding instead that
they "are to be judged by the rule of reason").
170 See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent the Problem that It
Can't Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1361-62 (1999) ("The main concern in finding a remedy for
['bad monopolist behaviors'] may be time: The technology environment moves at a lightning pace, and
by the time a federal case has been made out of a problem, the problem is proven, a remedy fashioned,
and appeals exhausted, the damage may already be irreversible.").
171 See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage
Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483, 502 (2006) ("[T]o advocate pri-
mary reliance on antitrust principles ignores important historical facts. Common carriage regulation,
both under the common law and statutorily, evolved prior to antitrust regulation. Thus, antitrust law
subsequently evolved to augment-that is, to address issues and situations not already encompassed
by--common carriage.... Advocates of a regime based solely on antitrust fail to explain how the is-
sues pertaining to the provider-to-customer relationship, that have been governed by the ex ante rules of
industry-specific common carriage regulation, will be adequately addressed by antitrust ex post reme-
dies." (footnotes omitted)).
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DoubleClick merger focused almost entirely on the economic effects of the
proposed combination, rather than the threats to privacy it posed.'72
Search engines are among the most innovative services in the global
economy. They provide extraordinary efficiencies for advertisers and con-
sumers by targeting messages to viewers who are most likely to want to re-
ceive them. In order to attract more users, search engines use revenues
from advertising to organize and index a great deal of content on the Inter-
net."' Like the major broadcast networks search engines are now beginning
to displace, they provide opportunities to view content (organic search re-
sults) in order to sell advertising (paid search results).'74 Search engines
have provoked antitrust scrutiny because proposed deals between major
search engines (and between search engines and content providers) suggest
undue coordination of competitors in an already concentrated industry."'
Those opposed to regulation often claim that antitrust law offers a
more targeted and efficient response to abuses. As Justice Breyer explained
in his classic work Regulation and Its Reform:
[T]he antitrust laws differ from classical regulation both in their aims and in
their methods. ... [T]hey act negatively, through a few highly general provi-
sions prohibiting certain forms of private conduct. They do not affirmatively
order firms to behave in specified ways; for the most part, they tell private
firms what not to do.... Only rarely do the antitrust enforcement agencies
create the detailed web of affirmative legal obligations that characterizes clas-
sical regulation."'
172 News Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission Closes Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec.
20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/googledc.shtm ("The Commissioners ... wrote
that 'as the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy
transactions that harm competition,' the FTC lacks the legal authority to block the transaction on
grounds, or require conditions to this transaction, that do not relate to antitrust. Adding, however, that it
takes consumer privacy issues very seriously, the Commission cross-referenced its release of a set of
proposed behavioral marketing principles that were also announced today.").
173 Pasquale, Categorizers, supra note 157, at 159-61 (describing the social function of many cate-
gorizers, including search engines).
174 According to the Google Home Page, "[W]e distinguish ads from search results or other content
on a page by labeling them as 'sponsored links' or 'Ads by Google.' We don't sell ad placement in our
search results, nor do we allow people to pay for a higher ranking there." Google, Inc., Corporate In-
formation: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
1s For example, the deal reached between Microsoft and Yahoo! that would have Microsoft's Bing
search engine deliver results for searches on Yahoo! has provoked antitrust concerns both domestically
and internationally. See Christopher S. Rugaber, Microsoft-Yahoo Deal to Face Tough Antitrust Probe,
ABCNEWS, July 29, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=8205494; see also Hear-
ing, supra note 110, at 48 (statement of Frank Pasquale, Professor, Seton Hall University School of
Law) ("Recent deals between major search engine providers have provoked scrutiny because they sug-
gest undue coordination of competitors in an already concentrated industry.").
176 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 156-57 (1982). But see A. Douglas Me-
lamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 13 (1995) (describing "two paradigms," the
law enforcement model and the regulatory model, and the shift of antitrust law from the former to the
latter).
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Most scholars skeptical of network neutrality point to antitrust law as
the proper limit on carriers' power."' For some of them, the FCC is an
anomaly, a vestigial regulator in thrall to an outdated style of command-
and-control regulation."' Many scholars reject governmental efforts to
shape the development of Internet connectivity as industrial policy and be-
lieve that authorities should only be involved in order to remedy abuses, not
to try to prevent them or to optimize communications generally.
In the case of search engines, that legal landscape currently exists. Actual
and threatened antitrust investigations have shaped Google's business prac-
tices as its dominance in search grows. Many believe that the DOJ's suspi-
cion of the company's proposed joint venture with Yahoo! in the search
advertising field effectively scuttled the deal by late 2008."' However, an-
titrust enforcement appears less promising in other situations involving in-
termediary technology." This section discusses the limits of antitrust in
addressing the cultural and political dilemmas raised by Google's proposed
Book Search deal with publishers,' t and its dominance of online advertis-
ing.
177 John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation-The Role of "Intermodal" and "Facilities-Based" Compe-
tition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 241, 282 (2009) ("Antitrust remedies play an impor-
tant role within deregulation debates because they provide a 'safety net' to address anticompetitive
conduct in the absence of regulation.").
178 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 103, at 183 (asserting that the broadband market is not "suited for
public utility-style regulation").
179 Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, The Plot to Kill Google, WIRED, Jan. 19, 2009, at 88,
available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-02/ff-killgoogle (noting that antitrust scruti-
ny culminated in a hearing in which the DOJ threatened to bring an antitrust case against Google and
that one prominent DOJ attorney expressed the view that Google already is a monopoly). Of course, the
antitrust laws do not flatly prohibit monopolies, only those attained via illicit means. See, e.g., Pac. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comm., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) ("Simply possessing monopoly power
and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act] . . . ."). For testimony, pre-
pared but not delivered, that argued that some of Google's practices are suspect, see Testimony of Ben-
jamin Edelman Scheduled Before the Task Force on Competition Policy & Antitrust Laws of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, June 27, 2008 (proposed testimony in front of hearing later cancelled, available
at http://www.benedelman.org/publications/ppc-competition-071008.pdf ("Google sets reserve prices
and other parameters that substantially determine prices.... Other Google practices, particularly
Google's restrictions on export and copying of advertisers' campaigns, further hinder competition in In-
ternet advertising-without any countervailing benefit whatever.").
1so Daniel Rubinfeld, Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51,
57 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (describing how "conservative economics has fostered a tendency to
downplay enforcement in dynamic technological industries in which innovation issues play a significant
role").
181 Despite the DOJ's intervention to affect the terms of the proposed settlement, many leading anti-
trust experts have argued that the settlement would not violate the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Einer El-
hauge, Why the Google Books Settlement Is Pro-Competitive 58 (Harvard Law Sch., Law & Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 646, Harvard Law Sch., Pub. Law & Theory Research Paper No. 09-45, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1459028 ("The settlement does not
raise rival barriers to offering [many] books, but to the contrary lowers them. The output expansion is
particularly dramatic for out-of-print books, for which there is currently no new output at all."); Amicus
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Privacy concerns are nearly impossible to address within the economic
models of contemporary competition law. Antitrust scrutiny did little to
address the privacy concerns raised when Google proposed to merge with
the web advertising firm DoubleClick.82 The proposed deal provoked a
complaint from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).'"' EPIC
claimed that Google's modus operandi amounts to a "deceptive trade prac-
tice":
Upon arriving at the Google homepage, a Google user is not informed of
Google's data collection practices until he or she clicks through four links.
Most users will not reach this page.. . . Google collects user search terms in
connection with his or her IP address without adequate notice to the user.
Therefore, Google's representations concerning its data retention practices
were, and are, deceptive practices.'84
One key question raised by the proposed merger was whether privacy
and consumer protection concerns like these can be addressed by traditional
antitrust analysis.'"' Privacy law expert Peter Swire argued that they can,
because "privacy harms reduce consumer welfare . .. [and] lead to a reduc-
tion in the quality of a good or service.""' Swire believed that consumers
would be worse off after the merger because of the unparalleled digital dos-
siers the combined entity could generate:
Google often has "deep" information about an individual's actions, such as de-
tailed information about search terms. Currently, DoubleClick sets one or
Brief of Antitrust Law and Economics Professors as Anici Curiae in Support of the Settlement, Authors
Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136(DC) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009), 2009 WL 2980740, available at
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/antitrust_profs.pdf
182 Dawn Kawamoto & Anne Broache, FTC Allows Google-DoubleClick Merger to Proceed, CNET
NEWS, Dec. 20, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/FTC-allows-Google-DoubleClick-merger-to-proceed/2100-
1024 3-6223631.html (describing U.S. authorities' blessing of the proposed deal). A similar dynamic
obtained in Europe. See Press Release, Europa, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed Acquisition of
DoubleClick by Google (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction
.do?reference=IP/08/426&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en%3Ehttp:H/europa.
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/426&format=HTML&aged=0&Ianguage=EN&guiLa
nguage=en ("The Commission's decision to clear the proposed merger is based exclusively on its ap-
praisal under the EU Merger Regulation. It is without prejudice to the merged entity's obligations under
EU legislation in relation to the protection of individuals and the protection of privacy with regard to the
processing of personal data and the Member States' implementing legislation.").
183 EPIC, supra note 17.
184 See Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, In re
Google Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc., No. 071-0170 (FTC Apr. 20, 2007), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/fic/google/epic-complaint.pdf at 9 [hereinafter Google, Inc. and DoubleClick
Complaint].
1ss See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything, Google and DoubleClick: A Bigger
Antitrust Problem than I Had Imagined, http://www.googlizationofeverything.com/2007/
10/google and doubleclick a bigge.php (Oct. 21, 2007, 16:05 EST).
186 Peter Swire, Protecting Consumers: Privacy Matters in Antitrust Analysis, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.americanprogress.orglissues/2007/10/privacy.html (italics omit-
ted).
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more cookies on an individual's computers, and receives detailed information
about which sites the person visits while surfing. DoubleClick has "broad" in-
formation about an individual's actions, with its leading ability to pinpoint
where a person surfs."'
Initial points of contention include (a) the definition of the products at
issue, and (b) how to weigh the costs and benefits of a merger. The com-
bined company would have different segments of "customers" in a two-
sided market'": (1) searchers trying to find sites, and (2) ad buyers trying to
reach searchers. Swire contends that many people care about privacy, and
"[i]t would be illogical to count the harms to consumers from higher prices
while excluding the harms from privacy invasions-both sorts of harms re-
duce consumer surplus and consumer welfare in the relevant market."'"
However, the web searcher category not only consists of consumers
who care about privacy, but also includes many people who do not highly
value it or who actively seek to expose their information in order to receive
more targeted solicitations. According to Eric Goldman's work on persona-
lized search, some may even consider the gathering of data about them to be
a service.' 0 The more information is gathered about them, the better inter-
mediaries are able to serve them relevant ads. Many economic models of
web publication assume that users "pay" for content by viewing ads;"' they
may effectively pay less if the advertisements they view bear some relation
to things they want to buy. So while Swire models advertising and data col-
lection as a cost to be endured, Google and DoubleClick argue that their
187 Swire, supra note 186. According to Swire, "[i]f the merger is approved, then individuals using
the market leader in search may face a search product that has both 'deep' and 'broad' collection of in-
formation. For the many millions of individuals with high privacy preferences, this may be a significant
reduction in the quality of the search product-search previously was conducted without the combined
deep and broad tracking, and now the combination will exist." Id.
188 For a definition of two-sided market, see Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tag, Net Neutrality on
the Internet: A Two-Sided Market Analysis I (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 07-45, N.Y. Univ. Law and
Econ., Research Paper No. 07-40, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1019121 ("[P]latforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and appli-
cations providers 'on the other side' of the Internet."). In the search engine context, consumers "pay" by
attending to ads, and ad-purchasers pay Google for the chance to get ad viewers' attention.
189 Swire, supra note 186.
190 Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 1151, 1162--64 ("Three
components determine an individual consumer's utility from a marketing exposure: (1) the consumer's
substantive interest in the marketing, (2) the consumer's nonsubstantive reactions to the marketing expo-
sure, and (3) the attention consumed by evaluating and sorting the marketing. . . . [A] consumer may
derive utility from the rote act of being contacted by marketers or exposed to the marketing, regardless
of the marketing content.").
"9 David S. Evans, The Economics of the Online Advertising Industry, 7 REv. NETWORK ECON.
359, 359 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/rme/vol7/iss3/2 (describing how many of the top
websites have adopted the "free-tv" model where the publisher generates traffic by not charging for
readers but then sell that traffic to advertisers).
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tracking (and the ads that result from it) are a service to customers.'92 Their
arguments prevailed, and Google officially acquired DoubleClick in
2008.'
Antitrust law is ill prepared to handle a "market" where some percen-
tage of consumers consider loss of privacy a gain and others consider it a
loss. Economic reasoning in general falters in the face of externalities,'94
but usually we can all agree that, say, pollution is a harm (or negative exter-
nality) and flowers are a boon (or positive externality). Privacy preferences
are much more idiosyncratic.
Critics of the merger do have a response to this problem of diverse pre-
ferences-they can shift from characterizing lost privacy as a cost of web
searching to describing it as a reduction in the quality of the services of-
fered by the merging entities.' Douglas Kysar's work on the product-
process distinction is encouraging here. Kysar has claimed that consumers
should have a right to make choices of products based on how the products
are made, not just how well they work."' Kysar argues "in favor of ac-
knowledging and accommodating [consumer] process preferences within
192 See Interview by Robert Siegel, NPR, with Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, CEO: Google Knows A
Lot About You, Then Forgets (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=1 13450803 ("We work really, really hard to give you choices .... [U]sers can entirely opt in or
opt out or opt for something in between when it comes to Google saving their searches." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). But Schmidt has also advised consumers that "[i]If you have something that you
don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place.. .. [T]he reality is that
search engines-including Google-do retain this information for some time and it's important, for ex-
ample, that we are all subject in the United States to the Patriot Act and it is possible that all that infor-
mation could be made available to the authorities." Bruce Schneier, My Reaction to Eric Schmidt,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/12/my reaction to.html (Dec. 9, 2009, 12:22 EST) (quot-
ing Eric Schmidt).
193 See Press Release, Google Inc., Google Closes Acquisition of DoubleClick (Mar. 11, 2008),
available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080311_doubleclick.html.
194 Compare Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1048 (2005) ("Tangible property law also implicitly rejects the idea that owners are entitled to
capture all positive externalities. If I plant beautiful flowers in my front lawn, I don't capture the full
benefit of those flowers-passers-by can enjoy them too. But property law doesn't give me a right to
track them down and charge them for the privilege-though owners of property once tried unsuccessful-
ly to obtain such a right." (footnotes omitted)), with HELLER, supra note 152, at 194 (discussing how
business improvement districts force holdouts to help fund aesthetic improvements in their neighbor-
hoods).
195 Swire, supra note 186. Both Supreme Court precedent and DOJ guidelines support this ap-
proach. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) ("The assumption
that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements
of a bargain--quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably af-
fected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, at 30-32 (1997) (efficient market behavior is indicated by lower prices, new
products, and "improved quality").
196 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regula-
tion of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REV. 526, 529 (2004) ("[C]onsumer preferences may be heavily
influenced by information regarding the manner in which goods are produced.").
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policy analysis, given the potential significance that such preferences may
serve in the future as outlets for public-minded behavior."197 Nevertheless,
the valuation problems here are daunting. How are we to determine how
much consumers are willing to pay to avoid privacy-eroding companies?'98
Perhaps, as Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman suggest in their
book Priceless, we should stop even trying to pretend that these decisions
can be made on anything approaching a purely economic basis.199 Engaging
in a cost-benefit analysis diminishes privacy's status as a right. Though
many scholars have compellingly argued for broader foundations for com-
petition law, the mainstream of contemporary antitrust policy in the United
States cannot accommodate such concerns.200 Antitrust's summum bonum is
the maximization of "consumer welfare," and this measure of efficiency is
notoriously narrow.20' For example, the DOJ was hard pressed to adequate-
ly factor in a basic democratic commitment to diverse communicative
channels during many media mergers.202
197 Id. at 534.
198 Christopher Yoo has demanded this kind of accounting in the context of net neutrality. See Yoo,
Beyond Neutrality, supra note 106, at 54 ("There is nothing incoherent about imposing regulation to
promote values other than economic welfare.... [but] such a theory must provide a basis for quantify-
ing the noneconomic benefits and for determining when those benefits justify the economic costs.").
199 FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8-9 (1993) ("The basic problem with narrow economic analysis of health
and environmental protection is that human life, health, and nature cannot be described meaningfully in
monetary terms; they are priceless. When the question is whether to allow one person to hurt another, or
to destroy a natural resource; when a life or a landscape cannot be replaced; when harms stretch out over
decades or even generations; when outcomes are uncertain; when risks are shared or resources are used
in common; when the people 'buying' harms have no relationship with the people actually harmed-
then we are in the realm of the priceless, where market values tell us little about the social values at
stake."). As Elizabeth Anderson has argued, "[t]o value or care about something in a particular way in-
volves a complex of standards for perception, emotion, deliberation, desire, and conduct that express and
thereby communicate one's regard for the object's importance." ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 11 (1993). It is often difficult or impossible to express such "perception, emo-
tion, deliberation, desire, and conduct" in monetary terms. Id. at 11, 15-16.
200 See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001) ("Almost everyone professionally
involved in antitrust today-whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observer-
not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also
agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine the consistency of
specific business practices with that goal.").
201 See Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 951, 1001 (2008)
(observing the primacy of allocative efficiency in antitrust analysis). Stucke notes that "[b]ehind alloca-
tive efficiency's fagade of positivism lie [many] moral questions . . . ." Id. See also Julie E. Cohen,
Network Stories, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 92 (2007) ("What makes the network good can only
be defined by generating richly detailed ethnographies of the experiences the network enables and the
activities it supports, and articulating a normative theory to explain what is good, and worth preserving,
about those experiences and activities.").
202 See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 857
(2002) ("[T]he dominant antitrust focus on power over pricing can be distinguished from power over the
content available for consumer choice. In the currently dominant paradigm, a merger that dramatically
reduced the number of independent suppliers of a particular category of content-say, news or local
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Given antitrust doctrine's pronounced tendency to suppress or elide the
cultural and political consequences of concentrated corporate power, the
Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics within the FTC are ill
equipped to respond to the most compelling issues raised by search en-
gines.203 The Google-Doubleclick merger proceedings ultimately ended
with an overwhelming win for Google at the FTC.204 This outcome was all
but inevitable given the foundations of contemporary antitrust doctrine,2 05
and is the logical outgrowth of overreliance on legal economic theory that
uncritically privileges market outcomes.206 As long as contemporary doc-
trine holds that antitrust is singularly focused on the "consumer welfare" a
proposed transaction will generate,207 antitrust policymakers will be unable
to address the cultural and political consequences of consolidation in the
search industry.
Antitrust challenges to the proposed settlement of a copyright lawsuit
by authors and publishers against Google's Book Search program are likely
to be similarly constrained.20 8 As in the Google-Doubleclick merger, the
news or Black activist news-creates no antitrust problem if, as likely, it does not lead to power to raise
prices.").
203 See STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK,
FTC File No. 071-0170 (FTC Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220
statement.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT OF FTC CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK] ("Although [pri-
vacy concerns] may present important policy questions for the Nation, the sole purpose of federal anti-
trust review of mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition.").
204 Id
205 Maurice Stucke describes and critiques this bias in some detail. See Stucke, supra note 201, at
1031 (describing a "mishmash of neoclassical economic theory, vignettes of zero-sum competition, and
normative weighing of the anticompetitive ethereal--deadweight welfare loss-against the conjectures
of procompetitive efficiencies" at the core of too much antitrust law and theory). Among his many im-
portant contributions to the literature, Stucke makes it clear that competition policy includes far more
goals and tactics than antitrust enforcement alone. Id. at 987-1008.
206 Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for "Critical Legal
Economics," 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1161 ("[T]hree of the most basic assumptions to the popular
[law & economics] enterprise-that people are rational, that ability to pay determines value, and that the
common law is efficient-while couched in the metaphors of science, remain unsubstantiated."). But
see JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND
THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 164-66 (2007) (describing the "notable movement to broaden the scope of
legal-economic theory under the rubric of socioeconomics").
207 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) (acknowledg-
ing the economic foundations of U.S. antitrust law).
208 The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has weighed in to object to the settle-
ment as it was presented to the court, and Judge Denny Chin ordered the parties to renegotiate its terms
in October and early November 2009 in order to respond to these and other objections. Motoko Rich,
Google and Authors Win Extension for Book Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at B3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/technology/companies/Ogbooks.html?_r=1; Brandon Butler, The
Google Books Settlement: Who Is Filing and What Are They Saying 1-2,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/20371700/fhe-Google-Books-Settlement-Who-Is-Filing-And-What-Are-
They-Saying (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) ("On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a Statement of
Interest arguing that the terms of the Settlement do not ... adequately represent the members of the
class ... [and] that the Settlement is in tension with the tenets of copyright law and that it creates serious
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privacy implications of Google's proposed deal with publishers are pro-
found. 209 Anyone who cares about public input into the future of access to
knowledge should approach the potential deal here warily,210 even if the
prospect of constructing a digital library of Alexandria tempts scholars.2 11
As Harvard librarian Robert Darnton has argued, only a naive optimist
could ignore the perils of having one profit-driven company effectively en-
trusted with a comprehensive collection of the world's books.212
When publishers challenged Google's book scanning in 2007, many
hoped that public interest groups could leverage copyright challenges to
Google's book search program to promote the public interest. Courts could
condition a pro-Google fair use finding on universal access to the contents
of the resulting database. Landmark cases like Sony v. Universal"' set a
precedent for taking such broad public interests into account in the course
of copyright litigation.214 Those who opt out of the settlement may be able
to fight for such concessions, but for now the battle centers on challenges to
the settlement itself.
Both James Grimmelmann 215 and Pamela Samuelson have suggested
several principles and recommendations to guide the court which must ap-
problems under antitrust law, as well."). The DOJ expressed dissatisfaction with the parties' most recent
proposed settlement, as well. See Cecilia Kang, Judge Puts Off Ruling on Google s Proposed Digital
Book Settlement, WASH. PosT, Feb. 19, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/18/AR2010021800944.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
209 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Google Book Search Settlement and Reader Privacy, available
at http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy/google-book-search-settlement (last visited July 11, 2010). As au-
thor Michael Chabon argues, "if there is no privacy of thought - which includes implicitly the right to
read what one wants, without the approval, consent or knowledge of others - then there is no privacy,
period." Id.
21o In response to the proposed Google Books Settlement, many substantive objections have been
filed to be considered at the "fairness hearing" that is to precede final judicial approval of the settlement.
Butler, supra note 208 ("The court ... has received a huge number of filings both from class-members
and from other interested parties.").
211 See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of Digital Arc-
hiving, 91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 990-91 (2007) (looking at the Google Book Search project as a means of
saving culture and "explor[ing] whether saving culture and saving copyright can be made compatible
goals").
212 Robert Darnton, The Library in the New Age, 55 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 12, 2008, at 39, avail-
able at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21514.
213 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
214 Frank Pasquale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony's Contribution to the Fair Use Doc-
trine, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 777, 790 (2005); see also Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 454 ("[T]o the
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal ben-
efits.... [T]he public interest in making television broadcasting more available... . supports an inter-
pretation of the concept of 'fair use' that requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood of
harm before he may condemn a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law.").
215 James Grimmelmann is an Associate Professor at New York Law School and a member of its
Institute for Information Law and Policy. He organized the foremost conference on the Google Book
Search Settlement and maintains an online compendium of documents related to it, called The Public
Index. See http://thepublicindex.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
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prove the settlement.216 Grimmelmann's work has focused primarily on an-
titrust issues,2 17 while Samuelson has concentrated on the concerns of aca-
demic authors.218 Grimmelmann has succinctly summarized the settle-
settlement's potential threats to innovation and competition in the market
for book indices, and books themselves:
The antitrust danger here is that the settlement puts Google in a highly privi-
leged position for book search and book sales.... The authors and publishers
settled voluntarily with Google, but there's no guarantee they'll offer similar
terms, or any terms at all, to anyone else.... [They] could unilaterally decide
only to talk to Google.219
Grimmelmann proposes several methods of assuring that the publishers will
deal with other book search services.220 Grimmelmann suggests an
"[a]ntitrust consent decree" and "[n]ondiscrimination among copyright
owners" as potential responses to the issues raised by the settlement.22'
Most of his proposal reflects a policy consensus that presumes competition
is the ideal solution to abuses of power online.222
Yet there are many reasons why competition is unlikely to arise in
book search services, even if the settlement is altered in order to promote
it.223 Licensing costs are likely to be a substantial barrier to entry. A key to
216 See Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN.
L. REv. (forthcoming, 2010), available at http://digital-scholarship.org/digitalkoans/2010/01/13/google-
book-search-and-the-future-of-books-in-cyberspace/ (discussing the "six categories of serious reserva-
tions that have emerged about the settlement ... reflected in the hundreds of objections and numerous
amicus curiae briefs filed with the court responsible for determining whether to approve the settle-
ment"); Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Dead Souls of the Google Booksearch Settlement, 52
CoMMs. ACM, July 2009, at 28, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=
1387782.
217 See generally James Grimmelmann, How to Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 J.
INTERNET L., Apr. 2009, at 1 (arguing that the Google Book Search antitrust case settlement should be
approved with additional measures designed to promote competition and protect consumers).
218 Letter from Pamela Samuelson, Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law, Universi-
ty of California, Berkeley School of Law, to Hon. Denny Chin, Judge, S.D.N.Y. (Sept. 3, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.scribd.com/doc/19409346/Academic-Author-Letter-090309 (urging the judge to
condition "approval of the Settlement Agreement on modification of various terms identified herein so
that the Agreement will be fairer and more adequate toward academic authors").
219 James Grimmelmann, In Google We Antitrust, TPMCAFl BOOK CLUB, Jan. 15, 2009,
http://tpmeafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/01/15/in google_we_antitrust.
220 Id.
221 Grimmelmann, supra note 217, at 15.
222 Grimmelmann does also propose some revised terms that would not be primarily designed to in-
centivize the development of new alternatives to Google Book Search; for example, he proposes
"[1]ibrary and reader representation at the [Book Rights R]egistry" that would administer many aspects
of the settlement. Id.
223 See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 65, at 1152 ("Though the market choices of users and tech-
nological developments constrain search engine abuse to some extent, they are unlikely to vindicate
[certain social] values...."); Frank Pasquale, Seven Reasons to Doubt Competition in the General
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competition in the search market is having a comprehensive database of
searchable materials; the more these materials need to be licensed, the less
likely it is that a second comer can set up its own book archive. As scholars
have demonstrated, deals like Google's proposed settlement help entrench
copyright holders' claims for licensing revenue.224 Moreover, innovation in
search is heavily dependent on having an installed base of users that effec-
tively "train" the search engine to be responsive.225 The more search que-
ries an engine gets, the better able it is to sharpen and perfect its
algorithm.226 Each additional user tends to decrease the cost of a better
quality service for all subsequent users by contributing activity that helps
the search engine differentiate between high and low quality organizational
strategies.227 Thus, incumbents with large numbers of users enjoy substan-
tial advantages over smaller entrants. Restrictive terms of service also deter
competitors who aspire to reverse engineer and develop better versions of
such services.228 In general purpose search, users cannot reproduce, copy,
or resell any Google service for any reason, even if the behavior is manual
and nondisruptive.229 Another section proscribes "creat[ing] a derivative
work of . .. the Software."230 Advertisers face other restrictions, as
Search Engine Market, MADISONIAN, Mar. 18, 2009, http://madisonian.net/2009/03/18/seven-reasons-
to-doubt-competition-in-the-general-search-engine-market.
224 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (describing how the decision as to whether to fight for fair use or license a copy-
righted work can be difficult "because the penalties for infringement typically include supracompensato-
ry damages and injunctive relief'). The existence of a licensing market often leads courts to conclude
that uses should be licensed: "[clombine these doctrinal gray areas and severe consequences with the
risk aversion that pervades key copyright industries, and the result is a practice of securing copyright
licenses even when none is needed." Id. Now that Google has agreed to license the books that will be
indexed in its book search, it is likelier that potential new entrants will need to license these books as
well. Given the law's dependence on industry practices as a benchmark for fair use determinations, their
legal case for free use of the relevant works has weakened.
225 James Pitkow et al., Personalized Search, 45 COMMs. ACM, Sept. 2002, at 50 (discussing me-
thods of personalizing search systems); Elinor Mills, Google Automates Personalized Search, CNET
NEWS, June 28, 2005, http://www.news.com/Google-automates-personalized-search/2100-1032 3-
5766899.html (reporting that Google launched a new version of its personalized search that monitors
previous searches to refine future results).
226 For example, if 100 people search for "alternatives to Microsoft Word software" on a search en-
gine on a given day and all pick the third-ranked result, the search algorithm may adjust itself and put
the third-ranked result as the first result the next day. The most-used search engine will have more data
to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals.
227 For a fuller explanation of one facet of this process, see the discussion supra note 50 (describing
fine-tuning of results via personalized search).
228 Though the precise terms of service of Google Book Search have not been finalized, Google's
more general terms of service are not promising. Google's terms of service prohibit any action that "in-
terferes with or disrupts" Google's services, networks, or computers. Google Inc., Terms of Service
§ 5.4 (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS. Repeated queries to the service necessary
to gather data on its operations may well violate these terms.
229 Id. § 5.5.
230 Id. § 10.2. Together, these sections of the TOS explicitly forbid much of the data harvesting that
might be necessary for rival firms to incrementally innovate beyond the current capacities of Google's
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Google's AdWords API Terms & Conditions "impede advertisers' efforts
to efficiently copy their ad campaigns to other providers."2 3' All of these
factors militate against robust competition in the comprehensive book
search field.
Quantum leaps in technology capable of overcoming these brute disad-
vantages are unlikely, particularly because search is as much about persona-
lized service as it is about technical principles of information organization
and retrieval.232 Current advantage in search is likely to be self-reinforcing,
especially given that so many more people are using the services now than
when Google overtook other search engines in the early 2000s. 233
What does an online world featuring an entrenched Google Book
Search as gatekeeper look like? Initially, it will prove a vast improvement
on the status quo of bulky, hard-to-acquire, physical copies of books. But
when we consider the ways in which knowledge can be rationed for profit
some worries arise. Google plans to monetize the book search corpus, and
one predictable way of increasing its value is to make parts of it unavailable
to those unwilling to pay high licensing fees. If the settlement were al-
lowed to charge such fees in an unconstrained manner, unmoored from the
underlying costs of operating the project, Google would essentially be ex-
ploiting a public easement (to copy books) for unlimited private gain. The
Open Content Alliance 234 has questioned the restrictive terms of the con-
tracts that Google strikes when it agrees to scan and create a digital data-
base of a library's books. 235  Those restrictive terms foreshadow potential
future restrictions on book search services. The proposed deal raises fun-
services. Commercial scraping of data, such as the use of software to automatically gather data from the
Google service by a competitor to establish a rival search engine, is prohibited by multiple sections.
Section 5.3 would proscribe both the automatic data collection and the use of a nonapproved "interface"
for accessing Google's database, regardless of the exact means. Id. § 5.3.
231 Edelman, supra note 179 (arguing that "Google's restrictions on export and copying of advertis-
ers' campaigns ... hinder competition in Internet advertising"). Though the hearing at which Professor
Edelman was to testify was cancelled, he has documented these problems in some detail at his website,
http://www.benedelman.org.
232 BATTELLE, supra note 35, at 8 (describing how personalized search enhances the value of search
engines to both users and advertisers). Due to trade secrecy, it is impossible for policymakers to discov-
er how much of the intermediary's success is due to its employees' inventive genius, and how much is
due to the collective contributions of millions of users to the training of the intermediary's computers.
233 See RANDALL STROSS, PLANET GOOGLE 98 (2008) (describing success of YouTube, a subsidiary
of Google).
234 Open Content Alliance Home Page, http://www.opencontentalliance.org (last visited Mar. 12,
2010).
235 See Open Content Alliance, Let's Not Settle for This Settlement,
http://www.opencontentalliance.org/2008/l l/05/lets-not-settle-for-this-settlement (last visited Mar. 12,
2010) ("At its heart, the settlement agreement grants Google an effective monopoly on an entirely new
commercial model for accessing books. It re-conceives reading as a billable event. This reading event
is therefore controllable and trackable. It also forces libraries into financing a vending service that re-
quires they perpetually buy back what they have already paid for over many years of careful collec-
tion.").
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damental questions about the proper scope of private initiative in organizing
and rationing access to knowledge.
Well-funded libraries may pay a premium to gain access to all sources;
lesser institutions may be granted inferior access. If permitted to become
prevalent, such tiered access to information could rigidify and reinforce ex-
isting inequalities in access to knowledge.236 Information tiering inequitably
disadvantages many groups, promoting the leveraging of wealth into status,
educational, or other occupational advantage. Information is not only in-
trinsically valuable, but also can be a positional good, useful for scoring ad-
vantages over others.237
Admittedly, Google Book Search has already proven a great resource
for scholars. It has made "book learning accessible on a new, worldwide
scale, despite the great digital divide that separates the poor from the com-
puterized."238 Current access to knowledge is stratified in many troubling
ways; the works of John Willinsky239 and Peter Suber240 identify many
troubling current forms of tiering that pale before the present impact of
Google Book Search.24' Given the aggressive pricing strategies of many
publishers and content owners, Google Book Search is a vital alternative for
scholars.
236 Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 MINN. J. L. SC. & TECH. 607, 608
(2007) (explaining how "much technology is used not just simply to improve its user's life, but also to
help its user gain advantage over others"). For example, "[tiest-preparation technologies .. .creat[e]
inequalities; students able to afford test-preparation courses, such as those offered by Kaplan, have a de-
finite advantage over those who do not have access to such courses." Id. at 615 (internal citation omit-
ted).
237 Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS 471, 472
(2006) ("[Positional goods] are goods with the property that one's relative place in the distribution of the
good affects one's absolute position with respect to its value. The very fact that one is worse off than
others with respect to a positional good means that one is worse off, in some respect, than one would be
if that good were distributed equally. So while it might indeed be perverse to advocate leveling down all
things considered, leveling down with respect to positional goods benefits absolutely, in some respect,
those who would otherwise have less than others."); Nestor Davidson, Property and Relative Status,
107 MICH. L. REv. 757, 757 (2009) ("[P]erhaps the most ubiquitous and important messages that prop-
erty communicates have to do with relative status, with the material world defining and reinforcing a
variety of economic, social, and cultural hierarchies."); Robert H. Frank, Are Concerns About Relative
Income Relevant for Public Policy?: Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare
Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REv. 137, 137 (2005) ("[E]conomic models in which individual utility depends
not only on absolute consumption, but also on relative consumption . .. identify a fundamental conflict
between individual and social welfare.").
238 Damton, supra note 212, at 76.
239 JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE 5 (2005) (describing extreme "digital divide" be-
tween those most connected to information resources and those cut off from them).
24o See generally Peter Suber, Open Access News, http://www.earlham.edu/-peters/fos/fosblog
.html. Suber is a leader of the open access movement, which aims to "[p]ut[] peer-reviewed scientific
and scholarly literature on the intemet[,] [m]ak[e] it available free of charge and free of most copyright
and licensing restrictions[,] [and] remov[e] the barriers to serious research." Id
241 See id. (chronicling on a daily basis news and controversies related to open access to scholarly
materials on the Internet).
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Nevertheless, there is no guarantee in the current version of the settle-
ment that Google Book Search will preserve its public-regarding features.242
It may well end up like the powerful "group purchasing organizations" in
the American health care system that started promisingly, but have evolved
to exploit their intermediary role in troubling ways.243 Google is more than
just one among many online service providers jostling for a competitive
edge on the web. It is likely to be the key private entity capable of compet-
ing or cooperating with academic publishers and other content providers.
Dedicated monitoring and regulation of the settlement terms now could
help ensure that book digitization protects privacy, diverse stakeholder in-
terests, and fair pricing of access to knowledge. Alliances between Google
Book Search and publishers deserve public scrutiny because they permit
private parties to take on what have often been public functions of deter-
mining access to and pricing of information. Where "regulatory copy-
right"244 has answered such questions with compulsory licenses,245 the new
alliances aspire to put into place a regime of cross-subsidization resistant to
public scrutiny or input.246 Given the vital public interests at stake in the
242 Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything, Global Google,
http://www.googlizationofeverything.com/2009/01/baiducom accused of riggingse.php (Feb. 19,
2009, 14:20 EST) ("'Public failure' [is a] phenomenon in which a private firm steps into a vacuum
created by incompetent or gutted public institutions. A firm does this not for immediate rent seeking or
even revenue generation. It does so to enhance presence, reputation, or to build a platform on which to
generate revenue later or elsewhere. It's the opposite of 'market failure.' And it explains a lot of what
Google does.").
243 For background on group purchasing organizations, see S. PRAKASH SETII, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: AN UNDISCLOSED SCANDAL IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 122 (Pal-
grave/MacMillan 2009) ("The benefits of combined purchases would be greatly reduced in conditions
where the middlemen ... control the entire process through restrictive arrangements with suppliers and
customers.").
244 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REv. 87, 91 (2004) (describing the growth
and scope of compulsory licensing statutes that provide for compensation for copyright holders while
denying them the right to veto particular uses of their work).
245 Marybeth Peters, the U.S. Register of Copyrights, has objected to the proposed Google Books
Settlement on the grounds that it would violate traditional norms of separation of powers in copyright
policy. See Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: The Proposed Google Book Set-
tlement Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 11 Ith Cong. (2009) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Reg-
ister of Copyrights), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Peters0909l0.pdf, at 2 ("In the
view of the Copyright Office, the settlement proposed by the parties would encroach on responsibility
for copyright policy that traditionally has been the domain of Congress.... We are greatly concerned
by the parties' end run around legislative process and prerogatives, and we submit that this Committee
should be equally concerned.").
246 Google considers its pricing and ranking decisions a closely held trade secret-an assertion that
would seem very strange if it came from a public library. See Pamela Samuelson, Google Books Is Not
a Library, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pamela-
samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-lib b317518.html ("Libraries everywhere are terrified that Google
will engage in price-gouging when setting prices for institutional subscriptions to [Google Book Search]
contents.").
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development of this information infrastructure, monitoring is vital.247 Ex-
tant law provides little assurance that it will actually occur.
III. WHAT COMPETITION AND INNOVATION MISS
The last section has described shortcomings of mainstream debates
over net neutrality and Google's growing power. These debates are partial
in two senses. They are incomplete because they are primarily focused on
the current and potential travails of online businesses (rather than those of
individual Internet users). They are also partial in the sense of being biased,
because they assume a methodological individualism that obscures the so-
cial values at stake in the development of communications infrastructure.
This Part responds to both biases by exploring the limits of individualism in
responding to problems of privacy and consumer protection. There are im-
portant structural similarities between ISPs and search engines. In each
realm, dominant intermediaries tend to gain more information about their
users, while shrouding their own business practices in secrecy. Internet pol-
icy needs to address the resulting asymmetry of power.
A. Privacy: An Irreducibly Social Practice
Leading scholars have modeled privacy as a purchasable commodity:
as with other products, individuals have varying preferences and abilities to
pay for more or less privacy.2 48  On this economistic view, firms will
emerge to compete to offer more or less privacy or will provide customers
with various "privacy settings" to permit them to tailor their online services.
Unfortunately, each of these assumptions is problematic, especially when
we reflect on the zero-sum nature of reputational capital in many settings.
Competition is often elevated as a solution to the privacy problem, but
few Internet intermediaries do (or even can) compete to grant users more
privacy. While net neutrality's opponents have been promoting competi-
tion as a cure-all for years, ninety-four percent of broadband users have, as
Professor Tim Wu notes, a choice of "zero, one, or two" carriers.249 Even in
the more competitive mobile market, it is virtually unheard of for consum-
247 In other work, I have proposed the creation of a "public option" in book search, which might re-
duce the need for monitoring of private entities. See Frank Pasquale, The Troubling Consequences of
Trade Secret Protection for Search Engine Rankings, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., Ed-
ward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2010) ("Like private health insurers, Google is a middleman, stand-
ing between consumers and producers of knowledge. ... If search engines consistently block or
frustrate measures to increase their accountability, governments should seriously consider funding pub-
lic alternatives."). This Article assumes that such a "public option" is unlikely to materialize in the near
future.
248 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1817, 1822 (1993) (discussing blackmail as a payment for secrecy).
249 See Wu Statement, supra note 72, at 45.
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ers to bargain for more or less privacy, or for carriers to compete on those
terms.
Instead, carriers are beginning to compete in ways that are corrosive to
privacy. As Paul Ohm has documented, "[b]roadband ISPs
have . .. search[ed] for new sources of revenue ... [by] 'trading user se-
crets for cash,' which Google has proved can be a very lucrative market."250
While user protests have deterred the most abusive practices, Ohm predicts
that "ISPs, faced with changes in technology, extraordinary pressures to in-
crease revenues, and murky ethical rules, will continue aggressively to ex-
pand network monitoring."2S Antitrust law has been slow to recognize
privacy as a dimension of product quality, and the competition that it pro-
motes can do as much to trample privacy as to protect it.
Intermediary competition is supposed to provide users with more com-
panies offering more options. However, competition is based primarily on
immediately experienced aspects of the service, such as price and speed.
The prospect of altering the terms of service for an intermediary like Face-
book or Google is beyond the ambition of almost all users.252
Even intermediaries with intimate knowledge of users' communica-
tions with family and friends have tended to assert almost unlimited powers
over user-generated content.253 The social networking site Facebook at-
tempted to legitimate this power by creating a system that allowed its users
to "vote" for changes to the terms of service before they are implemented.254
250 Ohm, supra note 36, at 17 (describing the many commercial pressures leading carriers to "mo-
netize[] behavioral data at the expense of user privacy").
251 Id. at 24; see also Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Part-
nerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 913 (2008) ("Indeed, Qwest's former CEO now
explicitly alleges that the NSA retaliated against his uncooperative firm by canceling contracts worth
hundreds of millions of dollars."); Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone
Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at Al. The National Security Agency "suggested that Qwest's [re-
fusal to engage in certain forms of surveillance] might affect its ability to get future classified work with
the government. Like other big telecommunications companies, Qwest already had classified contracts
and hoped to get more." Id
252 Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REv. 459, 469 (2006) ("[N]o one reads [many of
these] forms of contract anyway.. , ."); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen,
Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts I (N.Y.U. Law and Econ. Work-
ing Papers, Paper No. 195, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 199&
context-nyulewp ("We track the Internet browsing behavior of 45,091 households with respect to 66
online software companies to study the extent to which potential buyers access the associated important
standard form contract, the end user license agreement. We find that only one or two out of every thou-
sand retail software shoppers chooses to access the license agreement, and those few that do spend too
little time, on average, to have read more than a small portion of the license text.").
253 Chris Walters, Facebook 's New Terms of Service: "We Can Do Anything We Want with Your
Content. Forever. ", CONSUMERIST, Feb. 15, 2009, http://consumerist.com/5150175/facebooks-new-
terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-we-want-with-your-content-forever.
254 Posting of Mark Zuckerberg to the Facebook Blog, Governing the Facebook Service in an Open
and Transparent Way, http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=56566967130 (Feb. 26, 2009, 11:20
EST).
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However, University of Cambridge researchers have released a detailed re-
port which concludes that Facebook's system is merely "democracy thea-
tre" with little practical effect on the company's operations.255
These examples exemplify a common theme: as the use and reuse of
personal information becomes more deeply rooted in intermediary business
practices, the tension between competition and privacy becomes more pro-
nounced. For example, if a user of one social network wants to join anoth-
er, she will often be reluctant to do so because of "switching costs"; she has
already invested some time and effort in creating her existing profile. The
chief way of reducing those costs is to require data portability, which would
allow users to take their list of contacts, applications, pictures, and other
items with them when they want to leave. However, such a rule (or proto-
col for data storage) can render the rest of the user's social graph vulnerable
to unwanted exposure on the network the user migrates to.256 Randal Picker
has described the deep tension between competition and privacy that re-
sults, arguing that this tension creates an incentive for greater consolidation
of user information.257 Given these patterns of industry practice and con-
sumer behavior, privacy regulators' monitoring of oligopolistic online enti-
ties will be more effective than waiting for the elusive concept of "privacy
competition."
The classic laissez-faire approach here is to assume that the market will
address any lingering privacy concerns. Firms will meet a market demand
for privacy as individuals exit services that become too invasive of their
privacy. However, established social dynamics render that faith in uncoor-
dinated action suspect. Given the steady decline in individuals' expecta-
tions of privacy, both privacy and the reputations built on personal
information might better be considered irreducibly social goods than some
255 JOSEPH BONNEAU ET AL., DEMOCRACY THEATRE: COMMENTS ON FACEBOOK'S PROPOSED
GOVERNANCE SCHEME (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-jcb82/2009-03-29-facebook-
comments.pdf. Bonneau's report has been endorsed by the Open Rights Group. Posting ofJim Killock
to Open Rights Group Blog, Facebook's Theatrical Rights and Wrongs, http://www.openrightsgroup.org
/blog/2009/facebooks-theatrical-rights-and-wrongs (Apr. 1, 2009).
256 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1194 (2009) (arguing against
broad regulation requiring data portability on social networks because "it creates horizontal privacy
trouble"). Grimmelmann notes that "[elveryone who has access to 'portable' information on social net-
work site A is now empowered to move that information to social network site B. In the process, they
can strip the information of whatever legal, technical, or social constraints applied to it in social network
site A.... [M]andatory data-portability rules create a privacy race to the bottom for any information
subject to them." Id.
257 Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 1, 11-12 (2008) ("An uneven playing field that allows one firm to use the information that it
sees while blocking others from doing the same thing creates market power through limiting competi-
tion. We rarely want to do that. And privacy rules that limit how information can be used and shared
across firms will artificially push towards greater consolidation, something that usually works against
maintaining robust competition.").
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quanta of enjoyments individuals trade off for money.25 8 Once commodi-
fied, privacy and reputational integrity are inevitably parceled out to rich
and poor on differential terms. Moreover, given the frequently abstract
"benefits" that privacy and reputational integrity afford, they are often
traded away for competitive economic advantage.259 This process further
erodes the societal expectations of privacy that underwrite respect for repu-
tational integrity.260
A collective commitment to privacy is far more valuable than a private,
transactional approach that all but guarantees a race to the bottom.261 Net-
work neutrality regulations can include rules that will protect the privacy
that market competition, left on its own, will inevitably erode. One expert
even predicts that privacy concerns will "reinvigorate [the] stagnant debate
[over network neutrality] by introducing privacy and personal autonomy in-
to a discussion that has only ever been about economics and innovation."262
Reputational concerns should also be a larger part of public policy for
search engine intermediaries, as discussed in Part IV below.
B. Search and Carriage as Credence Goods
One major impediment to users' monitoring of intermediary perfor-
mance is a systematic information gap. If an individual uses an interme-
diary to find or contact a known entity and no relevant result appears, she is
likely to switch to a competitor; so too will a carrier's reported blocking of
certain sites or applications raise their devotees' ire. But it is difficult or
impossible for consumers to detect less drastic manipulations of results.
Both search for and carriage of information tend to be "credence goods,"
258 Charles Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 127, 139 (1995) (cri-
tiquing both subjectivism and methodological individualism and insisting that irreducibly social goods
"exist[] not just for me and for you, but for us, acknowledged as such").
259 Cass Sunstein and Robert H. Frank suggested in their work on cost-benefit analysis and relative
position that those who trade off safety or other intangibles will have additional resources to outcompete
peers who refuse to do so. See Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative
Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 323, 327 (2001) (discussing "the central importance of relative economic
position to people's perceptions of their own well-being").
260 Id at 323. The theory of safety in Sunstein and Frank's work applies just as well to privacy. Id.
at 326 ("[W]hen a regulation requires all [individuals to purchase] additional safety, each .. . gives up
the same amount of other goods, so no [one] experiences a decline in relative living standards. [The up-
shot is that] an individual will value an across-the-board increase in safety more highly than an increase
in safety that he alone purchases.").
261 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Naked in the Nonopticon, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 15, 2008, at B7
("When we complain about infringements of privacy, what we really demand is some measure of control
over our reputation in the world. Who should have the power to collect, cross-reference, publicize, or
share information about us, regardless of what that information might be? ... 'Self help' [in this con-
text] merely ratchets up the arms race of surveillance.").
262 Ohm, supra note 36, at 1; see also id. ("[T]his Article injects privacy into the network neutrality
debate-a debate about who gets to control innovation on the Internet. Despite the thousands of pages
that have already been written about the topic, nobody has recognized that we already enjoy mandatory
network neutrality in the form of expansive wiretapping laws.").
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whose value a consumer will have difficulty evaluating even after consum-
ing it.263 Often the user will have no idea that results are being manipulated
in a particular way.
This is one reason why the Federal Trade Commission has issued a
guidance to search engines regarding separation of paid and editorial con-
tent. In 2000, the FTC stated that "[t]he same consumer protection laws
that apply to commercial activities in other media apply online. The FTC
Act's prohibition on 'unfair or deceptive acts or practices' encompasses In-
ternet advertising, marketing and sales."2 " Though that report did not ex-
plicitly address paid ads on search engines, its general argument appears to
apply to that mode of advertising. For example, the report says that "the
key is the overall net impression of the ad-that is, whether the claims con-
sumers take from the ad are truthful and substantiated."265 Recent guidances
for bloggers leave little doubt that the agency (at least under current leader-
ship) is committed to requiring disclosure of commercial influence on on-
line content.266
Even if we assume that search engines abide by the FTC's specific
guidance letter issued in response to complaints about their practices267 and
263 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Me-
chanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing economic models involving "trust" and uncertain quali-
ty); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV.
941, 947, 965-66 (1963) (discussing behaviors influenced by information inequality in a medical con-
text); Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 67, 68-72 (1973) (exploring credence goods where quality cannot be evaluated through normal
use but only at additional cost).
264 FTC, DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 16, 1, at 1.
265 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
266 See FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising,
16 C.F.R. § 255 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/10/091005endorsementguidesfnnotice
.pdf (requiring disclosure of sponsorship or consideration offered in exchange for "any advertising mes-
sage (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other
identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that consum-
ers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the
sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring
advertiser").
267 See Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir. of Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin,
Executive Dir., Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalert
attatch.shtm. The Hippsley letter, made in response to an official complaint by Commercial Alert, ap-
pears to be a less formal response than an official advisory opinion issued pursuant to 16 CFR § 1.5
(2009), which permits the agency to issue "[ilndustry guides [as] administrative interpretations of laws
administered by the Commission for the guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in conformity
with legal requirements." The letter includes the recommendations of the staff that search engines se-
gregate organic results from those resulting from purchased AdWords. It is not considered an official
advisory opinion, although it fulfills many of the same functions as an advisory opinion or industry
guide (that is, it helps search engine companies avoid future official action from the FTC). See also
Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 65, at 1168-69 (discussing the implications of Ellen Goodman's work on
"stealth marketing" for search engines); Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in Internet
Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 353, 355 (2004) ("As a result of
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always strictly separate "editorial content" and paid listings, subtler forms
of manipulation could slip into their ranking algorithms. In many, if not
most cases, consumers lack both the incentive and the ability to detect such
manipulation. Given the lack of transparency of the search algorithms,
search consumers simply cannot reverse engineer the hundreds of factors
that go into a ranking,268 and they have little incentive to compare dozens of
search results to assess the relative effectiveness and authenticity of differ-
ent search engine results.269
New traffic management methods by carriers also challenge traditional
conceptions of user autonomy. Generally, the digital information sent over
the Internet is formatted into packets of data as specified by the Internet
Protocol (IP), as opposed to sending the data as a long stream of bytes of in-
formation.270 Packets consist of a header and a payload, the latter corres-
ponding to the substantive content of the information being sent.27'
Traditionally, carriers did not inspect the content of the packets. How-
ever, carriers have begun to inspect the actual content of a consumer's
transmitted or received data being sent over their networks by utilizing var-
ious technologies such as deep packet inspection and packet sniffing. Car-
riers may "inject" (or "spoof') additional packets into the data that their
consumers are receiving so as to interfere with specific online activities
(e.g., file sharing).272 These technologies allow carriers to command the
type of insights into their customers' behavior once only achieved by search
engines.27 The legacy of common carriage provides valuable precedents
congressional and administrative action, there are now specific guidelines in place requiring advertisers
to make clear disclosures about the commercial nature of their content."); Douglas MacMillan, Blogola:
The FTC Takes on Paid Posts, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, May 19, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/may2009/tc20090518 532031.htm (discussing "advertising guidelines that will re-
quire bloggers to disclose when they're writing about a sponsor's product and voicing opinions that
aren't their own").
268 Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude
Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 185 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of replicating a search en-
gine's work).
269 An effective search answers the searcher's query; authentic results are those unaffected by un-
disclosed commercial influences on the search engine's ranking of sites.
270 LYDIA PARZIALE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, TCP/IP TUTORIAL AND
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW, IBM CORP. 98-99 (2006), available at http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/red
books/pdfs/gg243376.pdf.
271 Id
272 PETER ECKERSLEY ET AL., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., PACKET FORGERY BY ISPS: A
REPORT ON THE COMCAST AFFAIR 1 (2007), http://www.eff.org/files/eff comcast report2.pdf
273 Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the
Balance of Power Between Intellectual Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 633, 636-37 (2008) ("ISPs have upgraded, or soon will upgrade, their networks with hardware
and software that enables them to acquire knowledge about what kinds of content they switch, route and
transmit."); Tim Wu, Has AT&T Lost Its Mind? A Baffling Proposal to Filter the Internet, SLATE, Jan.
16, 2008, http://www.slate.con/id/2182152. Wu criticizes AT&T's announcement "that it is seriously
considering plans to examine all the traffic it carries for potential violations of U.S. intellectual property
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for assuring some transparency in the development and implementation of
technologies that monitor the content information transmitted over the In-
ternet.274 As former FCC Chairman Michael Powell asserted, consumers
have a right to "meaningful information regarding their service plans," in-
cluding an understanding of exactly how they are being monitored and how
their behavioral data is monetized.275
Search engines are referees in the millions of contests for attention that
take place on the web each day. There are hundreds of entities that want to
be the top result in response to a query like "sneakers," "top restaurant in
New York City," or "best employer to work for." The top and right hand
sides of many search engine pages are open for paid placement; but even
there the highest bidder may not get a prime spot because a good search en-
gine strives to keep even these sections relevant to searchers. 276 The unpaid,
organic results are determined by search engines' proprietary algorithms,
though users often fail to distinguish between unpaid and paid place-
ments.277 Businesses can grow reliant on good Google rankings as a way of
attracting and keeping customers.
For example, John Battelle describes how the website 2bigfeet.com, a
seller of large-sized men's shoes, was knocked off the first page of
Google's results for terms like "big shoes" by a sudden algorithm shift in
November 2003, right before the Christmas shopping season.278 Neil Mon-
crief, the site's owner, attempted to contact Google several times, but said
he "never got a response." Google claimed that Moncrief may have hired a
search engine optimizer who ran afoul of its rules, but it would not say pre-
laws. The prospect of AT&T, already accused of spying on our telephone calls, now scanning every e-
mail and download for outlawed content is way too totalitarian for my tastes." Id.
274 Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of the
Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate,
78 FORDHAM L. REv. 641, 641 (2009) (exploring "the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act's proscrip-
tions against deceptive conduct as a legal limit on Internet Service Provider (ISP) discrimination against
Internet traffic," and arguing that the "Internet's architecture and codes presumed common carriage").
275 Powell, supra note 143, at 5; see also id. ("Providers have every right to offer a variety of ser-
vice tiers with varying bandwidth and feature options. Consumers need to know about these choices as
well as whether and how their service plans protect them against spam, spyware and other potential in-
vasions of privacy.").
276 Lastowka, supra note 34, at 1342-43 (describing current patterns of space allocation on search
results).
277 Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 518
(2005) ("Ultimately, searchers care only about the relevancy of the information they see, and artificial
divisions between 'ads' and 'content' mask important similarities in the searcher's relevancy determina-
tion process."); Lastowka, supra note 34, at 1345 ("The [organic-paid] distinction ... is not important
to the average user. In fact, the average Google user does not distinguish between the two types of links.
According to one recent study, five out of six search engine users cannot tell the difference between
sponsored links and organic results, and roughly half are unaware that a difference between the two ex-
ists.").
278 BATIELLE, supra note 35, at 156.
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cisely what those rules were.279 Just as the IRS is unwilling to disclose all
of its "audit flags," Google did not want to permit manipulators to gain too
great an understanding of how it detected their tactics.
So far claims like Moncrief's have not been fully examined in the judi-
cial system, largely because Google has successfully deflected them by
claiming that its search results embody opinions protected by the First
Amendment.280 Several articles have questioned whether blanket First
Amendment protection covers all search engine actions,28 ' and that conclu-
sion has not yet been embraced on the appellate level in the United States.
More importantly, even if state business tort claims are routinely rejected
on First Amendment grounds, the FTC has the authority to protect consum-
ers by revealing and prohibiting stealth marketing generally.282
The FTC was established to promote a level commercial playing field
and has the authority to protect both consumers and competitors from "un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."" The FTC
279 Id. at 157 (describing Moncrief's efforts to find out why his site dropped in the rankings); see al-
so Joe Nocera, Stuck in Google's Doghouse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2008, at Cl ("In the summer of
2006 ... Google pulled the rug out from under [web business owner Dan Savage, who had come to rely
on its referrals to his page, Sourcetool].... When Mr. Savage asked Google executives what the prob-
lem was, he was told that Sourcetool's 'landing page quality' was low.... At a cost of several hundred
thousand dollars, he made some of the changes Google suggested. No improvement."). Savage's com-
pany, TradeComet, sued Google for alleged violations of the antitrust laws. See Complaint, TradeCo-
met.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 09 CIV. 1400 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 455244. The suit
was dismissed on the basis of a forum selection clause. See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No.
09 CIV. 1400, 2010 WL 779325 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010).
280 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007) ("injunctive relief sought
by Plaintiff contravenes Defendants' First Amendment rights"); Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) ("The Court simply finds
there is no conceivable way to prove that the relative significance assigned to a given web site is false.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Google's PageRanks are entitled to 'full constitutional protec-
tion."'). However, the FTC's top priority in its regulation seems to be consumer confusion. As evi-
denced by the First Amendment doctrine with regards to commercial speech, courts are willing to
protect corporate speech insofar as it does not mislead consumers. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (observing that commercial speech is afforded
"a lesser protection ... than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression"). Thus, if consumer confu-
sion could be proven (most likely with proven real repercussions, which would be more difficult), it is
plausible that courts would be receptive to regulation.
281 See, e.g., Jennifer Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias
on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2007) (describing indexed entities' First Amendment
interests in an unbiased and open communicative forum); Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 125 (2006) (describing how blanket First Amendment protec-
tion for search engine rankings may not be appropriate).
282 Marla Pleyte, Online Undercover Marketing: A Reminder of the FTC's Unique Position to
Combat Deceptive Practices, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 14, 17 (2006) ("After analyzing common law solu-
tions and state-level consumer protection regimes, this paper reaches the conclusion that the FTC is uni-
quely positioned to address [online business practices that are] pernicious and virtually undetectable.").
283 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1914) ("The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except . .. common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate com-
merce....").
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has shown a willingness to engage in regulation of online advertising in or-
der to protect consumers.2 To ensure that ads are "clear and conspicuous,"
the agency advised advertisers to "[p]lace disclosures near, and when possi-
ble, on the same screen as the triggering claim [and] [u]se text or visual
cues to encourage consumers to scroll down a Web page when it is neces-
sary to view a disclosure."285 In the realm of stealth marketing in search en-
gines or via ISP fast-tracking, the logical extension of this line of reasoning
is a requirement that the intermediary disclose any consideration received in
exchange for prominent placement (or more rapid delivery) of advertising
or content.286
The FTC's extant guidance to search engines promoting the clear sepa-
ration of organic and paid results suggests that the agency is beginning to
assume these responsibilities.287 The FCC's response to Comcast's secre-
tive blocking of BitTorrent reveals similar consumer protection concerns at
that agency. While an opportunistic litigant could conceivably advance a
First Amendment right to promote products or positions without indicating
that the promotion has been paid for, such a challenge has not negated false
advertising law,288 and even political speakers have been required to reveal
their funding sources.289 Whatever substantive regulation may emerge,
monitoring intermediaries' actions does not infringe on their free expression
and may well enhance the autonomy and expressive capacities of users of
these conduits.
284 The FTC report insists that "[d]isclosures that are required to prevent an ad from being mislead-
ing, to ensure that consumers receive material information about the terms of a transaction or to further
public policy goals, must be clear and conspicuous." FTC, DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 16, at 1;
see also Sinclair, supra note 267, at 361 ("Though the FTC has not yet brought any actions against
search engines for the use of paid listings, it has brought actions in parallel situations involving televi-
sion and print content.").
285 FTC, DOT COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 16, 1 3, at 1. With regard to hyperlinks that "lead to
disclosures," the link should be "obvious," appropriately labeled, and well-situated. Id. at 1-2.
286 The FTC clearly has jurisdiction over broadband providers, but does not have jurisdiction over
entities subject to common carrier requirements. FTC STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY
COMPETITION POLICY 2-3 (2007) ("Regulatory jurisdiction over broadband services generally is subject
to the shared jurisdiction of the FCC, the FTC, and the [DOJ] .... [S]ince about 2000, the FCC has un-
dertaken a substantial and systematic deregulation of broadband services and facilities, concluding that
cable, wireline, powerline, and wireless broadband Internet access services are 'information services'
that are not subject to common carrier requirements. .. . [T]hese decisions have served to reinforce and
expand FTC jurisdiction over broadband Internet access services."). The FCC would need to impose
such requirements on carriers presently subject to common carrier requirements.
287 See supra note 267.
288 Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) (remarking that "the governing law
excludes false or misleading commercial speech from any First Amendment protection whatsoever").
289 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wis-
consin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L REV. 1064, 1107-08 (2008) ("In McConnell, the Justices voted 8-1 to
uphold section 201 of the BCRA against an argument that compelled disclosure violated the First
Amendment. Only Justice Thomas was swayed by that argument." (footnotes omitted)).
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Innovation and competition are only two of many tools we can use to
encourage responsible and useful intermediaries. We should rely on them
to the extent that (a) the intermediary in question is purely an economic (as
opposed to cultural or political) force; (b) the "voice" of the intermediary's
user community is strong;2 90 and (c) competition is likely to be genuine and
not contrived.29' For search engines and carriers, each of these factors
strongly militates in favor of regulatory intervention. The FTC and FCC
will need to recognize dominant carriers' and search engines' status as es-
sential infrastructure for communication and connection.
Carriers and dominant general-purpose search engines are just as im-
portant to culture and politics as they are to economic life. As credence
goods, they are not subject to many of the usual market pressures for trans-
parency and accountability. They do not presently face many strong com-
petitors, and are unlikely to do so in the immediate future. Their clear
cultural power should lead scholars away from merely considering econo-
mies of scale and scope and network effects in evaluating these intermedia-
ries' obligations. We need to consider all dimensions of network power
here-the full range of cultural, political, and social obstacles to accounta-
bility that dominance can generate.292 Moreover, policymakers must ac-
knowledge that competition itself can drive practices with many negative
externalities.
IV. MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
High-speed broadband connections and dominant search engines like
Google are at the center of a storm of controversy over the obligations of
Internet intermediaries. Most broadband markets are less than competitive.
They abut other concentrated intermediary markets in general-purpose
search, auctions, and social networking.293 In response to actual and poten-
tial abuses of that power, rules that would limit carriers' and intermediaries'
290 Competition provides users an "exit" option; regulation gives them more of a "voice" in its go-
vernance. Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit and Voice: An Expanding Sphere ofInfluence, in RIVAL VIEWS OF
MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 77, 78-80 (1986) (describing "exit" and "voice" as two
classic options of reform or protest). To the extent exit is available, voice (influence) within the relevant
intermediary becomes less necessary; to the extent voice is available, exit becomes less necessary.
291 Broadband competition has failed to materialize beyond duopoly for most Americans. There are
several reasons to suspect that Google's dominance of the general purpose search market will continue
to grow. See Pasquale, Seven Reasons, supra note 223 (discussing self-reinforcing dominance of lead-
ing search engines).
292 DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER 45 (2008) ("[T]he network power of English isn't the
result of any intrinsic features of English (for example, 'it's easy to learn'): it's purely a result of the
number of other people and other networks you can use it to reach. ... The idea of network pow-
er. . . explains how the convergence on a set of common global standards is driven by the accretion of
individual choices that are free and forced at the same time.").
293 For concentration statistics, see David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global
Internet Economy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 290 (2008) (citing COMSCORE, MYMETRIX KEY
MEASURES REPORT (Dec. 2007)).
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ability to discriminate against certain applications providers or to unduly
favor business partners are becoming increasingly necessary. Revelation of
such discrimination when it occurs is a first step toward accountability;
however, such transparency should be qualified in order to protect impor-
tant intellectual property interests of intermediaries.
Advocates of network neutrality and other progressive forms of Inter-
net governance now stand at a crossroads. They can continue to debate the
issue in economic terms, developing ever more refined models of infra-
structure and spillovers. Or they can shift the debate away from economic
theory to the cultural, reputational, and political dynamics unleashed by
new intermediaries. The economic debate on net neutrality should be com-
plemented with careful analysis of the noneconomic consequences of un-
trammeled power for intermediaries. Such concerns do not dissolve even if
carriers move away from commodity-provider status to integrate "smart
networks" with tethered hardware, search, or other functionalities. The
concerns apply a fortiori to dominant search engines which partner with
carriers or achieve greater market share than physical infrastructure provid-
ers.
Given the secrecy of search engines' ranking algorithms and carriers'
network management practices, it is very difficult for an entity to determine
whether it has a "stealth marketing problem" online-i.e., a competitor that
is somehow leveraging payments or business partnerships with intermedia-
ries in order to gain greater relative exposure.294 Recognizing this problem,
the FTC has taken some tentative steps toward addressing the potential for
consumer deception and cultural distortion. In 2002, the agency sent a let-
ter to various search engine firms recommending that they clearly and con-
spicuously distinguish paid placements from other results. 295 But neither the
FTC nor other potential regulators has followed up such guidance with ge-
nuine enforcement or systematic monitoring.
In order for the FTC to determine whether its guidance is actually be-
ing followed, it will need to develop sophisticated methods of understand-
ing how organic results are determined. Without such an understanding, it
will be impossible to distinguish between paid and organic content. This
monitoring needs to happen in real time, rather than after a dispute arises,
for many reasons. First, data retention may be spotty. Second, the history
of regulation of high technology industries indicates that government lag in
294 Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEx. L. REv. 83, 89 (2006)
("Stealth marketing .. . [can take the form of] conventional payola, where the sponsor promotes a media
experience, such as a musical work, by purchasing audience exposure to the experience as a form of ad-
vertisement. Pay-for-play in broadcasting is similar to the use of slotting fees in the retail industries to
obtain preferential shelf space in supermarkets and book stores. Online retail outlets also use slotting
fees of a sort when portals like Amazon and Google accept payments for exposure of a particular prod-
uct or service.").
295 See Hippsley, supra note 267 (recommending that search engines segregate organic results from
those resulting from purchased adwords); id. and accompanying text.
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understanding how critical infrastructure functions can effectively neuter
even a strong regulatory regime.296 In response to such problems, Danny
Weitzner (now the Associate Administrator of the Office of Policy Analysis
and Development in the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration) called for an "independent panel of technical, legal and
business experts to help [the FTC] review, on an ongoing basis the privacy
practices of Google."297 Such a panel could also develop the capacity for
understanding the ranking practices of Google and the traffic management
and monitoring done by internet service providers. This capacity could, in
turn, enable litigants to submit focused queries to a nonbiased third party
that could quickly give critical information to courts and agencies.298
A trusted advisory committee within the FTC could help courts and
agencies adjudicate coming controversies over intermediary practices.
Qualified transparency provides an excellent method for developing what
Christopher Kelty calls a "recursive public"--one that is "vitally concerned
with the material and practical maintenance and modification of the tech-
nical, legal, practical, and conceptual means of its own existence as a pub-
lic."299 Questioning the power of a dominant intermediary is not just a
preoccupation of the anxious. Rather, monitoring is a prerequisite for as-
296 See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Cen-
tury Discipline Addresses 21st Century Problems, Address to American Bar Association Section of An-
titrust Law's Antitrust Issues in High-Tech Industries Workshop (Feb. 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/hitch.shtm ("Many high-tech industries involve questions that are
challenging for lawyers and judges who typically lack a technical background.").
297 Danny Weitzner's Blog, What to Do About Google and Doubleclick? Hold Google to Its Word
with Some Extreme Factfinding About Privacy Practices, http://dig.csail.mit.edulbreadcrumbs/blog/
5?page=2 (Oct. 8, 2007, 11:24 EST) ("In the 1990s, the FTC under Christine Varney's leadership
pushed operators of commercial websites to post policies stating how they handle personal information.
That was an innovative idea at the time, but the power of personal information processing has swamped
the ability of a static statement to capture the privacy impact of sophisticated services, and the level of
generality at which these policies tend to be written often obscure the real privacy impact of the practic-
es described. It's time for regulators to take the next step and assure that both individuals and policy
makers have information they need."). This proposal could be integrated into current FTC practices.
See Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in the Coming Decade,
3 I/S J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 723, 727 (2007-2008) (describing an "impressive array of ac-
tions . . . to prosecute unfair or deceptive trade practices").
298 Any proposal along these lines will eventually have to address skepticism about state-sponsored
trusted entities, given the experience of those challenging trade secret-protected voting machine soft-
ware. See David Levine, Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 183 (2007)
("[T]he notion that a government-controlled or designated entity could adequately protect the interests
of the general public is dubious, and would turn on many variables that might undermine the third par-
ty's ability to operate in a completely public-oriented fashion. Indeed, where a state agency effectively
nullifies a law designed to protect the public's interest, the entire basis upon which an escrow regime
would be built-that is, trusting the entity charged with examining the escrowed material-is under-
mined. Thus, it is not readily apparent that a third-party (governmental or otherwise) might adequately
protect the general interests of the public.").
299 CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE 3
(2007).
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suring a level playing field online. As search engines increasingly become
the hubs of traffic on the web and assert the same Communications Decen-
cy Act (CDA) and Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) immunities
that carriers do, their actions need to become similarly subject to regulatory
review. 00
Undisclosed intermediary practices are a species of a larger genus of
problems related to trade-secret-protected innovation that effectively regu-
lates other forms of competition.30 ' Consumers compete for credit, and
trade-secret-protected FICO scoring sorts them out for lenders;302 messages
compete to land in our inboxes, and ISPs must deploy spam filters that sort
the wheat from the chaff. In the public realm, undisclosed voting machine
and breathalyzer software can determine which votes count and which do
not, who goes to jail for drunk driving and who goes free.30 3
A developed literature on online worlds has considered in some detail
whether law should intervene to regulate an online gaming company's regu-
lation of its players' conduct.3" Legal systems have also developed a body
of principles designed to regulate regulation, known as administrative
law.305 Certain principles of openness and due process drawn from adminis-
trative law should govern private entities' management of competition.
These principles are a natural extension of judicial practice in occasionally
appointing special masters to handle trade secrecy discovery disputes.30
The growing importance of trade secrets in technologies of discipline
and reward requires judges and policymakers to create nuanced regimes of
300 Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles, supra note 12, at 266 (arguing "that the safe
harbors that shield dominant search engines from liability also suggest patterns of responsibility for the
results they present . .. [because dominant search engines] and carriers are infrastructurally homolog-
ous ... [acting] simultaneously [as] stable conduits, dynamic cartographers, indexers, and gatekeepers
of the Internet").
301 For a fuller exploration of this issue, see Pasquale, supra note 247.
302 MYFICO, UNDERSTANDING YOUR Fico SCORE 1 (2007), available at http://www.myfico.com/
Downloads/Files/myFICOUYFSBooklet.pdf (stating that a FICO score is a calculated number that
allows lenders to estimate your credit risk).
303 See Charles Short, Guilt By Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in Florida DUI
Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REv. 177, 179 (2009) ("[T]he state should negotiate for source code access to
allow defendants to verify the machine's accuracy.").
3 See, e.g., THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack M. Balkin & Beth
Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
305 I owe this characterization of administrative law to University of Chicago law professor Tom
Ginsburg's discussion of the topic in a podcast on Chinese administrative law. See Tom Ginsburg, Why
China Allows Its Citizens to Sue the Government, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/07/why-
china-allow.html (University of Chicago Faculty Blog Podcast July 13, 2008, 6:09 PM).
306 For more on special masters, see James R. McKown, Discovery of Trade Secrets, 10 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 45 (1994) ("Courts may appoint special masters to determine
discovery disputes concerning trade secrets. In addition to the expressly enumerated methods, the offi-
cial comment to the Act notes that courts also have restricted disclosures to a party's counsel and his or
her assistants and have appointed a disinterested expert as a special master to hear secret information
and report conclusions to the court.").
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qualified transparency. When ranking systems are highly complex and in-
novation is necessary (as in search engine algorithms and spain detection), a
dedicated governmental entity should be privy to their development and
should serve as an arbiter capable of providing guidance to courts that
would otherwise be unable to assess complaints about the results the algo-
rithm generates.307 If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can safely
access critical national security information in a controlled environment in
order to protect individual privacy from governmental intrusions, a similar
entity should be privy to private sector activities that implicate the reputa-
tional and consumer protection interests described above. Given growing
cooperation between federal authorities and intermediaries, the stakes of
misrepresentation and mistake may be far more serious than the average
commercial dispute.30s
In the case of potential environmental hazards protected by trade se-
crets, a well-worn legal path has balanced citizen and consumer interests in
transparency with corporate interests in secrecy.309 For example, Hallibur-
ton and other resource-extraction companies have been accused of using
methods that could lead to the contamination of water sources.3"0 Hallibur-
ton's methods for extracting fuel have concrete value, which must in turn be
balanced against the public interest in safe water and air."' If the state went
ahead and exposed the secret, the proprietary method might lose all eco-
nomic value, but we can envision some process for compensating Hallibur-
ton for its loss.
The trade secrets of intermediaries are different in terms of the degree
of damage done to the company and consumers by trade secret exposure.
Their owners claim that if the trade secrets are released, the entire process
they regulate will be gamed."' In the worst case scenario, Google could
307 See Daniel J. Malooly, Physical Searches Under FISA: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 411, 412-14 (1998) (describing the operation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court).
308 Michaels, supra note 251, at 938 n. 167 (describing the identity and reputational harms of misi-
dentification, misappropriation, dissemination, retaliation, and chilling effects).
3 Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce
and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795, 1800-01 (1989) (critiquing the current balance as inadequately
protective of public safety).
3 Abrahm Lustgarten, Gas Execs Call for Disclosure of Chemicals Used in Hydraulic Fracturing,
PROPUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org/feature/gas-execs-call-for-disclosure-of-chemicals-used-in-
hydraulic-fracturing-102 ("It remains to be seen whether service providers such as Halliburton, and the
chemical manufacturers that supply them, will go along with a movement toward disclosure. . . .").
311 Lyndon, supra note 309, at 1812 (describing the interplay of trade secrecy and takings doctrine).
312 An example from software technology anticipates intermediary arguments here. See Micah
Schwalb, Exploit Derivatives & National Security, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 162, 184 (2007) ("Cisco used
trade secret protection in 2005 to lever an out-of-court settlement that prevented disclosure of a poten-
tially fatal vulnerability."); Carla Meninsky, Comment, Locked Out: the New Hazards of Reverse Engi-
neering, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 591 (2003) (observing that that the DMCA actually
limits reverse engineering and in essence enhances the scope of trade secrecy through an extension of
copyright).
164
104:105 (2010) Beyond Innovation and Competition
become a graveyard of spammers, scammers, and "black hat search engine
optimizers," all of whom raise the salience of their clients by tricking the
algorithm into upping the rank of their clients' sites. Carriers could be
overwhelmed by hackers, spam, and viruses. Each entity believes that its
ordering of online life must be secret if it is to succeed in deterring bad ac-
tors.
We can interpret these worries about gaming in two very different
ways. On the one hand, the trade secret owners claim guardianship over a
process that is more than a mere game."' Engineers prefer the rhetoric of
science and markets: they are mathematically assessing the link structure
and traffic of the Internet in order to satisfy consumer demands.314 Search
engineers think of themselves as pursuing a "positivist, experimental
science that has objectivity as an essential norm."3"s But in contrast with
natural science, which documents and explains regularities that will contin-
ue regardless of their being reported, the inherently social science of search
can provoke changes in human behavior as soon as it is modeled."' Com-
plete openness in search or carriage methods risks opening these processes
to a "spy versus spy" arms race of hacking and anticircumvention meas-
ures. 317
313 McKenzie Wark has discussed the negative connotations of the term "game" as applied to vari-
ous aspects of life. See MCKENZIE WARK, GAMER THEORY 1.2, at 6-7 (2007) ("Everything has value
only when ranked against another; everyone has value only when ranked against another. ... The real
world appears as a video arcadia divided into many and varied games. Work is a rat race. Politics is a
horse race. The economy is a casino.... Games are no longer a pastime, outside or alongside of life.
They are now the very form of life, and death, and time, itself.").
314 Elizabeth Van Couvering, Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science, and War: Discourses of
Search Engine Quality, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 866, 871 (2007) ("[T]wo major schemas
structure the development of search engine technology. The first I have chosen to call the market sche-
ma, because discourse in this schema refers mainly to business-related issues: costs, revenues, and com-
petition. The second major schema I call the science-technology schema; its discourse is dominated by
experiments, measures, proof, and utility.").
315 Id. at 874.
316 The prospect of gaming reveals a key difference between the human and natural sciences: I can
observe regularities in nature for some time and publication of my observations is not going to cause
molecules or plants to act any differently. But strategic humans can change their behavior on the basis
of knowledge about how others behave. As Jon Elster states, "In parametric rationality each person
looks at himself as a variable and at all others as constants, whereas in strategic rationality all look upon
each other as variables." Jon Elster, Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Metho-
dological Individualism, 11 THEORY AND SoC'Y 453, 463 (1982).
317 The EU Privacy directive also recognizes this tension. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note
48, at 1 41 ("Whereas any person must be able to exercise the right of access to data relating to him
which are being processed, in order to verify in particular the accuracy of the data and the lawfulness of
the processing; whereas, for the same reasons, every data subject must also have the right to know the
logic involved in the automatic processing of data conceming him, at least in the case of the automated
decisions referred to in Article 15 (1); whereas this right must not adversely affect trade secrets or intel-
lectual property and in particular the copyright protecting the software; whereas these considerations
must not, however, result in the data subject being refused all information.").
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Less commonly, but more tellingly, the rationale for "security via ob-
scurity" embraces the gamelike quality of the enterprise. Google's guide-
lines for webmasters, and the very existence of "white hat," legitimate
search engine optimizers, implies that some influencing of search engine re-
sults is acceptable. On this reading, there is a game in search engines, one
that can be played fairly or cheated on."'" Rather than elevating the map-
ping project as more than a game, this view embraces its game-like quali-
ties: follow the rules, generate enough interest from elsewhere on the web,
and you can gradually win the search engine game.
Both the game-embracing and game-rejecting rationales for absolute
trade secrecy are ultimately unconvincing. The putatively scientific aspira-
tion to map the web hides the values at stake in the general purpose search
engines' rankings. A search engine amounts to a cultural voting booth,
translating the activities of millions of searchers and linkers into a referen-
dum on the relevance of websites to any given query. Results in response
to a company's or person's name paint a picture of that entity that can either
raise or lower its profile and the esteem in which it is held."'
Meanwhile, the game-embracing viewpoint inadequately acknowledg-
es the gray areas mentioned above. While the aleatory quality of a roll of
the dice may increase the fun of playing Monopoly, something as serious as
a business's relative position in search results based on trademarks it owns
should not be similarly chancy.
In an era of increasing competitive pressures and income stratification,
we like to believe that markets, democracy, or some combination of the two
determine the results of these competitions. Those forms of spontaneous
coordination are perceived as legitimate because they are governed by
knowable rules. A majority or plurality of votes wins, as does the highest
bidder. Yet when markets and elections are mediated by institutions that
suffer transparency deficits, their legitimacy declines. Rather than being
voluntarily reaffirmed by spontaneous choices of consumers, dominance
can be purchased. To avoid such self-reinforcing cycles of advantage, both
search engines' ranking practices and carriers' network management should
be transparent to some entity capable of detecting both the illicit commodi-
fication of prominence and privacy-eroding practices engaged in by these
intermediaries.
318 Van Couvering, supra note 314, at 877 (asserting that the "war schema ... provides a reflection
on the identity of the producers as they assume the role of guardian or protector of something precious-
in this case, access to the Web").
319 See Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, The Picture and the Paint, http:/
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/01/the picture and.html (May 10, 2007, 12:26 EST) ("Iris
Murdoch has stated that 'Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself and then comes to resemble
the picture. This is the process which moral philosophy must attempt to describe and analyse.' But in
[Lawrence] Lessig's [REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008)],
Google is the entity that makes pictures of our world (and ourselves), and we are invited to celebrate our
participation in that process while downplaying the moral questions raised by its opaqueness.").
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There are some institutional precedents for the kind of monitoring that
would be necessary to accomplish these goals. For example, the French
Commission Nationale De L'Informatique et des Libertes (CNIL) has sev-
eral prerogatives designed to protect the privacy of French citizens.320 For
example, CNIL "ensure[s] that citizens are in a position to exercise their
rights through information" by requiring data controllers to "ensure data se-
curity and confidentiality," to "accept on-site inspections by the CNIL," and
to "reply to any request for information."32' CNIL also grants individual
persons rights to obtain information about the digital dossiers kept on them
and their use. For example, CNIL explains that French law provides that:
Every person may, on simple request addressed to the organisation in question,
have free access to all the information concerning him in clear language.
Every person may directly require from an organisation holding information
about him that the data be corrected (if they are wrong), completed or clari-
fied (if they are incomplete or equivocal), or erased (if this information could
not legally be collected).
Every person may oppose that information about him is used for advertising
purposes or for commercial purposes.322
320 Law No. 78-17 of January 6, 1978, J.C.P. 1978, III, No. 44692. English translation of law as
amended by law of August 6, 2004, and by Law of May 12, 2009, available
athttp://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/Act78-17VA.pdf, French language text modified through
Law No. 2009-526 of May 12, 2009, J.O., May 13, 2009, available at http://www.cnil.fr/la-cnil/qui-
sommes-nous/, French language consolidated version as of May 14, 2009, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000886460&fastPos=1 &fastRe
qld=826368234&categorieLien-cid&oldAction-rechTexte. Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et
des Libert6s (CNIL), founded by Law No. 78-17 of January 6, 1978, supra, is an independent adminis-
trative French authority protecting privacy and personal data held by government agencies and private
entities. Specifically, CNIL's general mission consists of ensuring that the development of information
technology remains at the service of citizens and does not breach human identity, human rights, privacy,
or personal or public liberties.
321 CNIL, Rights and Obligations, http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/rights-and-obligations/ (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010). Specifically, Chapter 6, Article 44, of the CNIL-creating Act provides:
The members of the "Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertds" as well as those of-
ficers of the Commission's operational services accredited in accordance with the conditions de-
fined by the last paragraph of Article 19 (accreditation by the commission), have access, from 6
a.m to 9 p.m, for the exercise of their functions, to the places, premises, surroundings, equipment
or buildings used for the processing of personal data for professional purposes, with the exception
of the parts of the places, premises, surroundings, equipment or buildings used for private purpos-
es.
Law No. 78-17 of January 6, 1978, J.C.P. 1978, III, No. 44692, ch. 6, art. 44, available at
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/Act78-17VA.pdf, at 30.
322 CNIL, Rights and Obligations, supra note 321.
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While the United States does not have the same tradition of protecting pri-
vacy prevalent in Europe,323 CNIL's aims and commitments could prove
worthwhile models for U.S. agencies.324
U.S. policymakers may also continue to experiment with public-
private partnerships to monitor problematic behavior at search engines and
carriers. For instance, the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus is a "voluntary, self-regulating body"
that fields complaints about allegedly untruthful advertising.325 The vast
majority of companies investigated by NAD comply with its recommenda-
tions, but can resist its authority and resolve the dispute before the FTC.326
Rather than overwhelming the agency with adjudications, the NAD process
provides an initial forum for advertisers and their critics to contest the va-
lidity of statements." NAD is part of a larger association called the Na-
tional Advertising Review Council (NARC), which promulgates procedures
for NAD, the Children's Advertising Review Unit (CARU), and the Na-
tional Advertising Review Board (NARB).32 8
Instead of an "Innovation Environment Protection Agency (iEPA)"
(the agency Lawrence Lessig proposed to supplant the FCC),329 I would
recommend the formation of an Internet Intermediary Regulatory Council
323 James Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151, 1155 (2004) (comparing U.S. and European privacy law).
324 For example, CNIL has not shied away from using its powers to investigate Google. CNIL,
Street View: la CNIL met en demeure Google de lui communiquer les donnies Wi-Fi enregistries,
http://www.cnil.fr/vos-responsabilites/le-controle-de-a-a-z/actualites/article/l7/street-view-la-cnil-met-
en-demeure-google-de-lui-communiquer-les-donnees-wi-fi-enregistrees/ (describing CNIL's response to
complaints about Googles's "street view" project).
325 Seth Stevenson, How New Is New? How Improved Is Improved? The People Who Keep Adver-
tisers Honest, SLATE, July 13, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2221968.
326 Id ("When an ad is brought to their attention, the NAD's lawyers review the specific claims at
issue. The rule is that the advertiser must have substantiated any claims before the ad was put on the air,
so the NAD will first ask for any substantiating materials the advertiser can provide. If the NAD law-
yers determine that the claims aren't valid, they'll recommend that the ad be altered. The compliance
rate on this is more than 95 percent. But if the advertiser refuses to modify the ad (this is a voluntary,
self-regulating body, not a court of law), the NAD will refer the matter to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. One such FTC referral resulted in an $83 million judgment against a weight-loss company.").
327 Id
328 NATIONAL ADVERTISING REVIEW COUNCIL, THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY'S PROCESS OF
VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES §2.1(a) (July 27, 2009) ("The National
Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (hereinafter NAD), and the Children's
Advertising Review Unit (CARU), shall be responsible for receiving or initiating, evaluating, investigat-
ing, analyzing (in conjunction with outside experts, if warranted, and upon notice to the parties), and
holding negotiations with an advertiser, and resolving complaints or questions from any source involv-
ing the truth or accuracy of national advertising."). Though billed as "self-regulation," it is difficult to
see how the policy would have teeth were it not self-regulation in the shadow of an FTC empowered by
the Lanham Act to aggressively police false advertising. The FTC has several mechanisms by which to
regulate unfair business practices in commerce. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006) (giving the commis-
sion the authority to register an official complaint against an entity engaged in unfair business methods).
329 See supra note 101.
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(IIRC), which assists both the FCC and FTC in carrying out their present
missions.330 Like the NARC, the IIRC would follow up on complaints made
by competitors, the public, or when it determines that a practice deserves
investigation. If the self-regulatory council failed to reconcile conflicting
claims, it could refer complaints to the FTC (in the case of search engines,
which implicate the FTC's extant expertise in both privacy and advertising)
or the FCC (in the case of carriers). In either context, an IIRC would need
not only lawyers, but also engineers and programmers who could fully un-
derstand the technology affecting data, ranking, and traffic management
practices.
The IIRC would research and issue reports on suspect practices at In-
ternet intermediaries, while respecting the intellectual property of the com-
panies it investigated. An IIRC could generate official and even public
understanding of intermediary practices, while keeping crucial proprietary
information under the control of the companies it monitors. An IIRC could
develop a detailed description of safeguards for trade secrets, which would
prevent anyone outside its offices from accessing the information.331
Another option would be to allow IIRC agents to inspect such information
without actually obtaining it. An IIRC could create "reading rooms" for its
experts to utilize, just as some courts allow restrictive protective orders to
govern discovery in disputes involving trade secrets. The experts would re-
view the information in a group setting (possibly over a period of days) to
determine whether a given intermediary had engaged in practices that could
constitute a violation of privacy or consumer protection law. Such review
would not require any outside access to sensitive information.
I prefer not to specify at this time whether an IIRC would be a private
or public entity. Either approach would have distinct costs and benefits ex-
plored (in part) by a well-developed literature on the role of private entities
in Internet governance.332 Regardless of whether monitoring is done by a
governmental entity (like CNIL) or an NGO (like NARC), we must begin
developing the institutional capacity to permit a more rapid understanding
of intermediary actions than traditional litigation permits.333
330 It could include a Search Engine division, an ISP division focusing on carriers, and eventually
divisions related to social networks or auction sites if their practices begin to raise commensurate con-
cerns.
331 This is the way that the NAD proceeds. It provides specific procedures under which the partici-
pants can request that certain sensitive information be protected. See NAT'L ADVERTISING REVIEW
COUNCIL, THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY'S PROCESS OF VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION § 2.4(d)-(e), at
4-5 (2009), http://www.nadreview.org/07_Procedures.pdf (discussing procedure for confidential sub-
mission of trade secrets).
332 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N.
KY. L. REv. 822, 822 (2001) (examining "in particular the nature and limits of a key private regulator of
the Internet: standard-setting organizations and their institution of open, interoperable standards").
33 Google has already recognized the need for some kind of due process in response to complaints
about its labeling of certain websites as "harmful" (due to the presence of viruses or other security
threats at the sites) via the Stop Badware program. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 30, at 171 ("Requests for
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It is not merely markets and antitrust enforcement that are insufficient
to constrain problematic intermediary behavior-the common law is also
likely to fall short. It is hard to imagine any but the wealthiest and most so-
phisticated plaintiffs' attorneys attempting to understand the tweaks to the
Google algorithm that might have unfairly diminished their clients' sites'
salience. Trade secrets have been deployed in the context of other litigation
to frustrate investigations of black box algorithms.334 Examination of
Google's algorithms subject to very restrictive protective orders would
amount to a similar barrier to accountability; given its recent string of litiga-
tion victories, it is hard to imagine rational litigants continuing to take on
that risk. Moreover, it makes little sense for a court to start from scratch in
understanding the complex practices of intermediaries when an entity like
the IIRC could develop lasting expertise in interpreting their actions.
A status quo of unmonitored intermediary operations is a veritable
"ring of Gyges," tempting them to push the envelope with privacy practices
which cannot be discovered by their victims. Distortions of the public
sphere are also likely. While a commercially influenced "fast-tracking" or
"up-ranking" of some content past others might raise suspicions among its
direct (but dispersed) victims, the real issues it raises are far broader. If an
online ecology of information that purports to be based on one mode of or-
dering is actually based on another, it sets an unfair playing field whose bi-
ases are largely undetectable by lay observers. Stealth marketing generates
serious negative externalities that menace personal autonomy and cultural
authenticity. Moreover, the degree of expertise necessary to recognize
these externalities in the new online environment is likely to be possessed
by only the most committed observers.
This potent combination of expertise and externalities is a classic ra-
tionale for regulation. As Danny Weitzner's proposal for "extreme fact-
finding" (in the context of the Google-DoubleClick merger review)
recognized, only a dedicated group of engineers, social scientists, attorneys,
and computer scientists are likely to be adept enough at understanding
search engine decisions as a whole to understand particular complaints
review-which included pleas for help in understanding the problem to begin with-inundated Stop-
Badware researchers, who found themselves overwhelmed in a matter of days by appeals from thou-
sands of Web sites listed. Until StopBadware could check each site and verify it had been cleaned of
bad code, the warning page stayed up."). Google's cooperation with the Harvard Berkman Center for
Internet Research to run the Stop Badware program could prefigure future intermediary cooperation
with NGOs to provide "rough justice" to those disadvantaged by certain intermediary practices.
334 See Jessica Ring Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons from
the Jennings v. Buchanan Congressional Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 397, 397-98
(2008) ("[T]he litigation ultimately was utterly inconclusive as to the reason for the 18,000 electronic
undervotes because discovery targeting the defective voting system was thwarted when the voting ma-
chines' manufacturer successfully invoked the trade-secret privilege to block any investigation of the
machines or their software by the litigants."); Short, supra note 303, at 179 ("[T]he state should nego-
tiate for source code access to allow defendants to verify the machine's accuracy.").
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about them.335 Someone needs to be able to examine the finer details of the
publicly undisclosed operation of culturally significant automated ranking
systems-that is, to watch those who watch and influence us."'
CONCLUSION
ISPs and search engines have mapped the web, accelerated e-
commerce, and empowered new communities. They also pose new chal-
lenges for law. This Article has both built on and critiqued extant cyberlaw
literature focused on the legal disputes between these intermediaries. The
dominant focus on interbusiness conflicts is losing relevance as entities
cooperate more in mergers and joint ventures. While such cooperation can
be economically efficient, it has many troubling consequences for users.
Individuals are rapidly losing the ability to affect their own image on the
web, or even to know what data others are presented with regarding them.
When web users attempt to find information or entertainment, they have lit-
tle assurance that a carrier or search engine is not subtly biasing the presen-
tation of results in accordance with its own commercial interests.
Those skeptical of the administrative state may find a proposal to
"watch the watchers" problematic.337 They think of intermediaries as pri-
marily market actors, to be disciplined by market constraints. However, the
development of dominant Web 2.0 intermediaries was itself a product of
particular legal choices about the extent of intellectual property rights and
the responsibilities of intermediaries made in legislative and judicial deci-
sions in the 1990s. As intermediaries gained power, various entities tried to
bring them to heel-including content providers, search engine optimizers,
Weitzner, supra note 297. Weitzner proposes that "[r]egulators should appoint an independent
panel of technical, legal and business experts to help them review, on an ongoing basis the privacy prac-
tices of Google." Id. The panel would be "made up of those with technical, legal and business expertise
from around the world." Id. It would hold "public hearings at which Google technical experts are avail-
able to answer questions about operational details of personal data handling." Id. There would be "staff
support for the panel from participating regulatory agencies, "real-time publication of questions and
answers," and "[a]n annual report summarizing what the panel has learned." Id.
336 In the meantime, Google has been developing a tool that would help consumers detect if their In-
ternet service provider was "running afoul of Net neutrality principles." Stephanie Condon, Google-
Backed Tool Detects Net Filtering, Blocking, CNET NEWS, Jan. 28, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13578 3-10152117-38.htmil ("[The tool, M-Lab,] is running three diagnostic tools for consumers: one to
determine whether BitTorrent is being blocked or throttled, one to diagnose problems that affect last-
mile broadband networks, and one to diagnose problems limiting speeds."). It remains to be seen
whether Google itself would submit to a similar inspection to determine whether it was engaging in
stealth marketing or other problematic practices.
See, e.g., Posting of Berin Szoka to the Blog of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, Net Neu-
trality Regulation => Online Product/Service Definitions => Online Taxation, http://blog.pff.org/arch
ives/2009/09/net neutrality regulation onlineproductservice de.html (Sept. 30, 2009, 9:40 EST)
("[T]he slippery slope of creeping common carriage is real and we're already heading down it, with cy-
ber-collectivist 'luminaries' like Jonathan Zittrain and Frank Pasquale demanding neutrality regulation
for devices, application platforms like iTunes and Facebook, and search!").
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trademark owners, and consumer advocates. In traditional information law,
claims under defamation and copyright law might have posed serious wor-
ries for these companies. However, revisions of communications and intel-
lectual property law in the late 1990s provided safe harbors that can trump
legal claims sounding in each of these other areas."' Some basic reporting
responsibilities are a small price to pay for continuing enjoyment of such
immunities.
Any policy analysis of dominant intermediaries should recognize the
sensitive cultural and political issues raised by them. While economics
proceeds on a paradigm of maximizing consumer welfare, this goal is but
one of many dimensions along which intermediary performance should be
measured. Neither the FTC nor the FCC presently has the type of technical
and social scientific expertise necessary to address these concerns. Quali-
fied transparency of intermediary practices would assist policymakers and
courts that seek to address the cultural, reputational, and political effects of
their dominance.
Economic analysis of network neutrality has focused on comparisons
of the Internet to utilities and infrastructural transportation facilities like
freeways, trains, postal services, and airports. Yet the online world funda-
mentally differs from the transport and energy sectors-it has more cultural
impact and political consequences. Carriers and search engines determine
how well individuals can connect to a metaverse of ideas, entertainment,
and common interests. New practices like deep packet inspection raise pri-
vacy concerns different than Transportation Security Administration screen-
ing or EZ-Pass monitoring. These concerns cannot be integrated into
conventional economic analysis and provide alternative, noneconomic
grounds for comprehensive monitoring of carriers and search engines.
Someone must watch the watchers.
Dominant search engines and ISPs are the critical infrastructure for
contemporary culture and politics. As these dominant intermediaries have
gained more information about their users, they have shrouded their own
business practices in secrecy. Internet policy needs to address the resulting
asymmetry of knowledge and power. Yet before they make substantive
rules, key administrators must genuinely understand new developments.
While the FTC and the FCC have articulated principles of editorial in-
tegrity in search engines and net neutrality for carriers, they have not en-
gaged in the monitoring necessary to enforce these guidelines. Privacy
protection in the digital age also requires regulators capable of fully under-
338 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006) (safe harbor); Com-
munications Decency Act of 1997, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (safe harbor for intermediaries). For
critical commentary on the latter, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort
Law, 80 WASH. L. REv. 335, 371 (2005) ("An activist judiciary, however, has radically expanded § 230
by conferring immunity on distributors. Section 230(c)(1) has been interpreted to preclude all tort law-
suits against ISPs, websites, and search engines. Courts have ... haphazardly lump[ed] together web
hosts, websites, search engines, and content creators into this amorphous category.").
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standing intermediaries' data practices. Monitoring based on a principle of
qualified transparency would fill these regulatory gaps. Qualified transpa-
rency respects legitimate needs for confidentiality while promoting individ-
uals' capacity to understand how their reputations-and the online world
generally-are shaped by dominant intermediaries.
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